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CONTRACTING FOR PROCEDURE

KEVIN E. DAVIS* & HELEN HERSHKOFF**
ABSTRACT
Judicial decisions of public courts increasingly are based on
“contract procedure,” private rules of procedure that the parties draft
and assent to before a dispute even has arisen. These rules govern
such matters as the forum in which the proceeding will be conducted,
whether a jury will be involved in adjudicating the dispute, the scope
of rights of discovery, and rules of evidence. The practice deserves
greater attention and should raise more profound concerns than the
academic literature currently suggests. We argue that contract procedure operates as a form of privatization that effectively outsources
government functions to private contracting parties. As such, contract
procedure has the potential to promote self-governance, encourage
innovation, and secure efficiency. Yet it also permits unelected and
unaccountable contract drafters to reshape adjudication, procedural
rulemaking, and substantive law with virtually no meaningful
oversight by Congress, agencies, or the courts. The practice of contract procedure has effects that spill over from the private world of
the contracting parties into a world in which more public modes of
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deliberation and decision making have traditionally prevailed. Our
argument that these spillovers may be negative draws from welldeveloped theoretical concerns about the potential inefficiency of the
private production of public goods, the potential threats to political
competition posed by allowing economic actors to influence the
exercise of adjudicative power, the dangers of exit from public institutions highlighted by Albert Hirschman’s theory of exit, voice and
loyalty, and Michael Walzer’s account of the appropriate boundaries
of the different “spheres of justice.” We suggest a package of reforms
that are aimed at the system effects that we identify and that are
designed to capture the benefits of privatization while ensuring the
transparency, public-regarding values, and information production
that are essential to sound judicial administration. The two central
reforms can be easily administered and would encourage greater
oversight by Congress, agencies, and the courts. The two reforms are:
(1) a requirement that the civil cover sheet that typically accompanies
the filing of a complaint in a public court inquire whether the parties
have agreed to deviate from any public rules of procedure and (2) a
requirement that any such deviation be a mandatory topic of discussion at a judicial pre-trial conference and that the court consider
and assess the likely effect of the customized rule in terms of party
fairness, judicial integrity, and administrative efficiency.
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INTRODUCTION
The last generation has seen a subtle but discernable shift in the
relation between private mechanisms for dispute resolution and
the public courts.1 As the literature well documents, increasing
numbers of civil disputes, particularly those involving consumer and
employment contracts, are now decided by private decision makers
such as arbitrators, mediators, and judges hired for the occasion.2
Depending on the perspective, these private processes allow the
parties to exit—or exile the parties—from the public system of
adjudication, effectively “carving out spheres of ‘private government’” with their own tribunals, procedures, and rules of decision.3
On a parallel track, private process has migrated in surprising ways
1. See, e.g., Judith Resnik, Procedure as Contract, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 593, 594-600
(2005) (discussing the surge in arbitration agreements and consent decrees); see also Ettie
Ward, Mandatory Court-Annexed Alternative Dispute Resolution in the United States Federal
Courts: Panacea or Pandemic?, 81 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 77, 78 (2007) (reporting that “ADR is
firmly entrenched in the litigation process”).
2. See Judith Resnik, Courts: In and Out of Sight, Site, and Cite, 53 VILL. L. REV. 771,
773 fig.1 (2008) (documenting the increased “privatization of court-based processes across the
docket”); see also Jean R. Sternlight, Rethinking the Constitutionality of the Supreme Court’s
Preference for Binding Arbitration: A Fresh Assessment of Jury Trial, Separation of Powers,
and Due Process Concerns, 72 TUL. L. REV. 1, 5 (1997) (“In virtually every business transaction, including those involving individuals, large institutions are requiring consumers and
employees to give up their constitutional rights to a jury trial, an impartial judge, and due
process, by agreeing in advance that any dispute shall be resolved through binding
arbitration.”). Private judges and mediators also increasingly are used for family disputes. See
Sheila Nagaraj, Comment, Marriage of Family Law and Private Judging in California, 116
YALE L.J. 1615, 1617 (2007) (reporting on the use of private judges to resolve family disputes
in California); Jana B. Singer, The Privatization of Family Law, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1443, 1587
(discussing the shift from adjudication to mediation to resolve family disputes and observing
that the “judiciary has generally welcomed the opportunity to reduce its involvement in
divorce and custody disputes”). Some commentators question whether this trend will continue
worldwide, pointing to international dissatisfaction with commercial arbitration. See Steven
Seidenberg, International Arbitration Loses Its Grip: Are U.S. Lawyers To Blame?, A.B.A. J.,
Apr. 2010, at 50, 51 (citing survey results showing increasing dissatisfaction with international commercial arbitration as compared to litigation).
3. See Kenneth R. Davis, When Ignorance of the Law Is No Excuse: Judicial Review of
Arbitration Awards, 45 BUFF. L. REV. 49, 130-31 (1997) (quoting Heinrich Kronstein, Business
Arbitration—Instrument of Private Government, 54 YALE L.J. 36, 66 (1994)); see also JOHN D.
DONAHUE, THE PRIVATIZATION DECISION: PUBLIC ENDS, PRIVATE MEANS 150 (1989) (reporting
that civil litigants “are increasingly abandoning crowded public courtrooms” in favor of forprofit dispute-resolution services).
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into the public courts: despite public rules of procedure, judicial
decisions increasingly are based on private rules of procedure
drafted by the parties before a dispute has arisen.4 These procedures
include the forum in which proceedings will be conducted,5 whether
a jury will be involved in adjudicating the dispute,6 the scope of
rights of discovery,7 and rules of evidence.8
The practice of “contract procedure”—by which we mean the
practice of setting out procedures in contracts to govern disputes
that have not yet arisen, but that will be adjudicated in the public
courts when they do arise—has only recently begun to attract
scholarly attention.9 We believe greater attention is warranted.
First, contract procedure appears to be an important phenomenon
in its own right. Second, without considering the implications of
contract procedure it is difficult to gauge the ramifications of other
forms of private involvement in dispute resolution, including arbitration and post-dispute procedural stipulations. Indeed, without
4. See David Horton, The Shadow Terms: Contract Procedure and Unilateral
Amendments, 57 UCLA L. REV. 605, 607 (2010) (“Rather than the government, private actors
create procedural rules; rather than yielding to the merits, these rules generate litigation; and
rather than marching in lockstep, cases follow their own ‘mini-codes of civil procedure.’”)
(footnote omitted).
5. See Michael E. Solimine, Forum-Selection Clauses and the Privatization of Procedure,
25 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 51, 51-52 (1992).
6. See Michael L. Moffitt, Customized Litigation: The Case for Making Civil Procedure
Negotiable, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 461, 494 (2007) (discussing ex ante jury trial waivers);
Elizabeth Thornburg, Designer Trials, 2006 J. DISP. RESOL. 181, 183-91 (discussing ex ante
jury trial waivers); Armanda R. Szuch, Comment, Reconsidering Contractual Waivers of the
Right to a Jury Trial in Federal Court, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 435, 435 (2010) (arguing that “if
federal law is to be applied [to determine the validity of ex ante jury waivers, then] the less
rigorous standard” applied to arbitration agreements should be adopted as the standard); cf.
Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration Clauses, Jury-Waiver Clauses, and Other Contractual Waivers
of Constitutional Rights, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 167, 169-70 (2004) (discussing jury
waivers that result from arbitration agreements).
7. See Norman T. Braslow, Contractual Stipulation for Judicial Review and Discovery
in United States-Japan Arbitration Contracts, 27 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 659, 667-70 (2004).
8. See David H. Taylor & Sara M. Cliffe, Civil Procedure by Contract: A Convoluted
Confluence of Private Contract and Public Procedure in Need of Congressional Control, 35 U.
RICH. L. REV. 1085, 1086 (2002) (discussing ex ante contract terms that treat “what evidence
may or may not be presented as proof”).
9. See Jaime Dodge, The Limits of Procedural Private Ordering, 97 VA. L. REV. 723, 72728 (2011) (collecting references to recent literature); Daphna Kapeliuk & Alon Klement,
Contractualizing Procedure 2 (Dec. 31, 2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1323056 (observing that contract and procedure scholars “have paid
little attention” to ex ante contract procedure).
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knowing how “public” the public courts will be, one cannot meaningfully assess allowing litigants to opt out of the public courts in favor
of private processes. Even for its fiercest critics, arbitration may be
the lesser of two evils in comparison to courts that private actors are
free to reconfigure through contract procedure. Others may conclude
that contract procedure represents the best way for the public courts
to respond to the issues raised by arbitration and other private
processes.10
Assessment of the practice of contract procedure is hampered by
both the absence of a satisfactory framework for analysis and a lack
of empirical data. Contract procedure is often seen as a form of
private ordering. As such, we might expect the practice to promote
self-governance, encourage innovation, and secure efficiency.11 We
believe, however, that the public effects of contract procedure also
must be directly considered. In our view, these procedures effectively limit the decision making of courts, and their use in the public
courts raises special concerns that go beyond the interests of the
immediate parties. The existing literature does not fully appreciate
these concerns, and, in the absence of data it is difficult to determine their significance.
We argue in this Article that contract procedure functions as a
form of privatization—the outsourcing of government functions—
and that it implicates the structure and design of public institutions.12 Like other forms of outsourcing, contract procedure can be
10. Loïc Cadiet, Les conventions relatives au procès en droit français: Sur la contractualisation du règlement des litiges, 62 RIVISTA TRIMESTRALE DI DIRITTO E PROCEDURA CIVILE
7, 10 (2008) (describing contract procedure as a response to the crisis of justice); Henry S.
Noyes, If You (Re)Build It, They Will Come: Contracts To Remake the Rules of Litigation in
Arbitration’s Image, 30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 579, 646 (2007) (“If we can remake litigation
in arbitration’s image, we get the best of both worlds.”); see also In re Prudential Ins. Co. of
Am. 148 S.W.3d 124, 132 (Tex. 2004) (“Even if the option [of an enforceable jury trial waiver]
appeals only to a few, some of the tide away from the civil justice system to alternate dispute
resolution is stemmed.”).
11. See HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS
IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 159-61 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey
eds., 1994) (treating private ordering as the “primary process of social adjustment”); see also
Marc Galanter, Justice in Many Rooms: Courts, Private Ordering, and Indigenous Law, 19 J.
LEGAL PLURALISM 1, 1-2 (1981) (criticizing “legal centralism,” that is, “[t]he view that the
justice to which we seek access is a product that is produced—or at least distributed—
exclusively by the state”).
12. For discussion of the varieties of privatization, see Ronald A. Cass, Privatization:
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expected to affect public confidence in the government institutions
that endorse its use; its persistence and growth demand assessment
not simply of its impact on the individual case but of its structural
effect on the civil justice system as a whole. Yet unlike other forms
of outsourcing used by government, contract procedure is subject to
virtually no meaningful oversight by Congress, by agencies, or by
the courts.
Our argument builds on two insights. The first is economic:
private transactions presumptively are efficient only if there are no
negative externalities, that is to say, no adverse effects on third
parties.13 That the conduct of a civil proceeding might affect the
interests of people beyond the immediate parties to the dispute—
much less the subset of those parties who happen to be in a contractual relationship prior to the dispute—is not a novel idea.14
Moreover, it is commonplace in law-and-economics literature to
characterize adjudication as a source of public goods, meaning goods
Politics, Law, and Theory, 71 MARQ. L. REV. 449, 456-62 (1988).
13. For the general principle, see Robert C. Clark, Contracts, Elites, and Traditions in the
Making of Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1703, 1706 (1989) (expressing the conventional
view that “except when there are bad third-party effects (alias ‘negative externalities’),
managers and investors should be free to change any ... default rules by mutual agreement”);
see also Note, A Law and Economics Look at Contracts Against Public Policy, 119 HARV. L.
REV. 1445, 1447 (2006) (“[T]he fact that a contracted-for activity will have negative effects on
third parties does not make the transaction economically inefficient per se; this inefficiency
occurs only if the net third-party harms exceed the net benefits to the contracting parties.”).
For the concept applied to litigation, see, for example, Gillian K. Hadfield, The Public and the
Private in the Provision of Law for Global Transactions, in CONTRACTUAL CERTAINTY IN
INTERNATIONAL TRADE: EMPIRICAL STUDIES AND THEORETICAL DEBATES ON INSTITUTIONAL
SUPPORT FOR GLOBAL ECONOMIC EXCHANGES 252 (Volkmar Gessner ed., 2009) (explaining this
idea); William B. Rubenstein, Why Enable Litigation?: A Positive Externalities Theory of the
Small Claims Class Action, 74 UMKC L. REV. 709, 721 (2006) (“If litigation exchanges take
place that benefit the parties but harm third parties, this spillover effect, or negative
externality, demonstrates that the system is not in a Pareto optimal state; one might say it
has exceeded it by producing too many detrimental exchanges.”); see also Cass R. Sunstein,
Legal Interference with Private Preferences, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1129, 1130-31 (1986)
(discussing situations in which law should interfere with private preferences in the absence
of harm to third parties).
14. See Judith Resnik, Whose Judgment? Vacating Judgments, Preferences for Settlement,
and the Role of Adjudication at the Close of the Twentieth Century, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1471,
1491-1501 (1994) (discussing the effect of settlement on third-party access to information). For
elaboration of this insight in the context of bankruptcy proceedings, see Elizabeth Warren &
Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Contracting Out of Bankruptcy: An Empirical Intervention, 118
HARV. L. REV. 1197, 1254 (2005) (criticizing the “two-party contract model” of bankruptcy
proceedings).
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the benefits from which can be consumed by many actors without
reducing the benefits to any one actor.15 Among the most important
of those public goods, although not the only, are various kinds of
information that help policymakers and members of the general
public identify and respond to social problems.16 The practice of
contracting for procedure can be conceptualized, therefore, as contracting over the production of public goods that play a critical role
in shaping public policy, encouraging social trust, and supporting
democratic values. Whether to tolerate the practice differs conceptually from debates about whether to permit private actors
freedom to contract over the production or exchange of other goods
and services; its effect goes well beyond the impact of the transaction upon the individual parties to the contract.17
The second insight is political: democratic institutions, including
courts, ought to be preferred sites for effecting changes in law and
public policy. This is not to ignore the lessons of “new governance”
theory18 or popular constitutionalism,19 both of which credit private
15. See Bryan Caplan & Edward P. Stringham, Privatizing the Adjudication of Disputes,
9 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 503, 504 (2008) (calling law a “perfect example of a public good
that government simply must supply if order is to exist at all,” but recognizing criticism of the
state-centric approach to law provision); see also Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, CAFA’s Impact
on Litigation as a Public Good, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 2517, 2518 (2008) (defining a public good
and explaining “that litigation itself is a public good”).
16. See Lisa Blomgren Bingham, When We Hold No Truths To Be Self-Evident: Truth,
Belief, Trust, and the Decline in Trials, 2006 J. DISP. RESOL. 131, 154 (discussing “the
relationship between changes in our relation to information, the resulting uncertainty and
loss of trust, and its impact on the civil trial”); Dennis J. Drasco, Public Access to Information
in Civil Litigation vs. Litigant’s Demand for Privacy: Is the “Vanishing Trial” an Avoidable
Consequence?, 2006 J. DISP. RESOL. 155, 157 (discussing the role of public adjudication in
generating information and social trust).
17. See Taylor & Cliffe, supra note 8, at 1100-04 (stating that judicial enforcement of a
pre-litigation agreement “allows a private agreement to alter the procedural system
established by statute and rule in a manner that is frequently inconsistent with the publicly
constructed system”); Thornburg, supra note 6, at 206 (“[T]he public court system serves both
private and public functions.”).
18. See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic
Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 267 (1998) (putting forward a system of directly
deliberative polyarchy “in which power is decentralized to enable citizens and other actors to
utilize their local knowledge ... but in which ... coordinating bodies require actors to share
their knowledge”).
19. See, e.g., Larry D. Kramer, Popular Constitutionalism, Circa 2004, 92 CALIF. L. REV.
959, 959 (2004) (describing a legal order in which “the role of the people is not confined to
occasional acts of constitution making”).
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actors with an important lawmaking function. However, when
power to make or to change policy is in the hands of private
individuals, care must be taken to ensure transparency, participation, and the possibility for informed disagreement.20 The practice
of contract procedure lacks these qualities. By effect, it permits
unelected and unaccountable contract drafters to reshape a function
that reasonably is regarded as a core governmental function,21 and
it does so, we argue, in ways that can be expected to suppress popular input and to inhibit alternative points of view.
Part I of this Article frames the discussion that follows. It briefly
describes the scope of ex ante contract procedure and examines
judicial treatment of the practice. Part II summarizes and assesses
concerns about the effects of contract procedure on the immediate
parties to the disputes it governs. Although contract procedure in
theory affords flexibility, generates efficiency, and provides choice,22
ex ante agreements are not always mutually beneficial to the parties and in some cases inappropriately extinguish constitutional and
statutory rights.23 These concerns are the focus of much of the current literature. Part III reframes the discussion by characterizing
contract procedure as a form of outsourcing that implicates the
design of the public system of dispute resolution—a function that in
contemporary parlance is inherently governmental. In our view, the
outsourcing of this aspect of the civil justice system interferes with
the production of a key byproduct of public adjudication—information. The resulting information deficit and biases impede and
20. See Louis L. Jaffe, Law Making by Private Groups, 51 HARV. L. REV. 201, 221 (1937)
(“Tolerated, covert monopolies—power exercised indirectly—may be much more difficult to
attack or to ameliorate than the edicts of majorities arrived at openly and according to the
forms of law.”).
21. See Harold I. Abramson, A Fifth Branch of Government: The Private Regulators and
Their Constitutionality, 16 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 165, 167-68 (1989) (distinguishing between
“the privatization of core governmental responsibilities—the making of laws and the
adjudication of disputes” and “the privatization of specific governmental services such as
garbage collection and public transportation”).
22. See Caplan & Stringham, supra note 15, at 528 (stating that these advantages may
be secured through “the stern discipline of free competition”); see also Robert E. Scott &
George G. Triantis, Anticipating Litigation in Contract Design, 115 YALE L.J. 814, 856-60
(2006) (explaining that ex ante contract procedure can “increase the incentive bang for the
enforcement buck”).
23. See, e.g., Horton, supra note 4, at 607-08 (summarizing the arguments for and against
contract procedure).
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distort collective efforts to identify problems, to forge solutions, and
to promote public values. Consequently, we argue, contract procedure has effects that spill over from the private world of the
contracting parties and into a world in which more public modes of
deliberation and decision making have traditionally prevailed. Our
argument that these spillovers may well be negative draws from
well-developed theoretical concerns about the potential inefficiency
of private production of public goods, the potential threats to political competition posed by allowing economic actors to influence the
exercise of public power, and Michael Walzer’s account of the
appropriate boundaries of the “spheres of justice.”24 Part IV suggests
a package of reforms aimed at the system effects we have identified.25 Our goal is to capture the benefits that are identified with
outsourcing, while ensuring the transparency, public-regarding
values, and information production that are essential to sound
judicial administration. A conclusion briefly considers the potential
“state-breaking function” of contract procedure, which, if left unchecked, we believe could produce a constitutional transformation
that inappropriately reshapes the relation of citizen to government
and of government to market.26
I. AN OVERVIEW OF CONTRACT PROCEDURE
This Part describes the practice of contract procedure in the
United States. To preview the discussion, those who wish to study
the practice are inhibited by a lack of information: we know surprisingly little about the scope of the practice, the nature of the
agreements, and the impact of particular contract terms on judicial
24. MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY, at
xiv (1983) (describing “a society where no social good serves or can serve as a means of
domination”).
25. See Adrian Vermeule, System Effects and the Constitution, 123 HARV. L. REV. 4, 6
(2009) (“A system effect arises when the properties of an aggregate differ from the properties
of its members, taken one by one.”).
26. The term appears in Daniela Caruso, Private Law and State-Making in the Age of
Globalization, 39 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1, 3 (2006). See Harold J. Krent, The Private
Performing the Public: Delimiting Delegations to Private Parties, 65 U. MIAMI L. REV. 507,
508-09 (2011) (stating that the use of private parties “in contexts ranging from national
security to claims adjudication ... raises profound questions of constitutional propriety and
democracy”).
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resolution. Contracts that contain procedural terms generally are
not collected in a public database; unlike consent decrees, they are
not published with conventional legal materials, such as judicial
decisions, and they frequently elicit very little judicial discussion.
In short, contract procedure, even as used within the public court
system, appears to be flying beneath the radar and escaping oversight and empirical study.
A. Contract Procedure and Commercial Practice
There is a widespread perception that customized procedure is an
increasingly important feature of contracting practice among U.S.
firms, although writers disagree about whether the practice has
gone too far or not far enough.27 Writing in 1992, Michael E.
Solimine pointed to the rise of forum selection clauses, choice-of-law
clauses, and waivers of service of process.28 To these provisions we
can add waiver of the right to trial by jury,29 contractual terms
dealing with the evidentiary burden of proof,30 and evidence stipulations.31 Yet information about the practice or extent of contracting for procedural terms is difficult to obtain; we lack empirical data
27. Compare Taylor & Cliffe, supra note 8, at 1161-62 (calling for congressional regulation
of contract procedure), with Robert J. Rhee, Toward Procedural Optionality: Private Ordering
of Public Adjudication, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 514, 564, 570-71 (2009) (criticizing civil procedure
for persisting as a system of “fixed rules” that fails to provide litigants with opportunities for
“private choice”).
28. Solimine, supra note 5, at 52; see also Faith Stevelman, Regulatory Competition,
Choice of Forum, and Delaware’s Stake in Corporate Law, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 57, 118 (2009)
(observing that parties “commonly” contract over choice of forum “in merger agreements and
other highly negotiated corporate and commercial contracts”).
29. See, e.g., Jarod S. Gonzalez, A Tale of Two Waivers: Waiver of the Jury Waiver Defense
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 87 NEB. L. REV. 675, 678 (2009) (“Jury waivers
in commercial agreements have been ubiquitous for many years.”); Brian S. Thomley,
Comment, Nothing is Sacred: Why Georgia and California Cannot Bar Contractual Jury
Waivers in Federal Court, 12 CHAP. L. REV. 127, 127 (2008) (“Federal courts have long
recognized that the right to a civil jury trial may be waived in advance by private
agreement.”).
30. Scott & Triantis, supra note 22, at 857-58 (explaining that many contracts contain
contractual burden-of-proof provisions).
31. See Taylor & Cliffe, supra note 8, at 1086 (discussing pre-litigation agreements, in
which parties to a contract “designate what evidence may or may not be presented as proof”);
cf. Noyes, supra note 10, at 607 (“It is generally acknowledged that ex ante contracts to alter
the rules of evidence are enforceable.”).
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about patterns in the use of procedural terms; and we know little
about the distribution of the practice across different kinds of
parties, claims, and industries. The absence of information about
contract procedure cannot be explained by the fact that it is implemented through private contracts. Arbitration agreements are also
private contracts, but, as a result of sustained judicial and academic
attention,32 we know significantly more about when arbitration
agreements are used33 and the types of procedures they set out.34
The few empirical studies about ex ante contract procedure in
the publicly sponsored courts focus on agreements between corporate actors. In a study of 412 merger-and-acquisition contracts,
32. See, e.g., Martin H. Malin, Privatizing Justice—But By How Much? Questions Gilmer
Did Not Answer, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 589, 602-05 (2001) (summarizing empirical
studies about arbitration). Clauses mandating arbitration in disputes between credit card
companies or securities firms and their customers have attracted particular attention. See,
e.g., Myriam Gilles, Opting Out of Liability: The Forthcoming, Near-Total Demise of the
Modern Class Action, 104 MICH. L. REV. 373, 397-98 (2005); Samuel Issacharoff & Erin F.
Delaney, Credit Card Accountability, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 157, 158 (2006).
33. The available data suggest that arbitration clauses are particularly common in
consumer contracts and that businesses often present them to consumers on a take-it-orleave-it basis. See Stephan Landsman, ADR and the Cost of Compulsion, 57 STAN. L. REV.
1593, 1600-01 (2005); see also Linda J. Demaine & Deborah R. Hensler, “Volunteering” To
Arbitrate Through Predispute Arbitration Clauses: The Average Consumer's Experience, 67
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 55, 56-57 (2004) (examining the prevalence and form of arbitration
clauses in businesses likely to be patronized by consumers); Theodore Eisenberg, Geoffrey P.
Miller & Emily Sherwin, Arbitration’s Summer Soldiers: An Empirical Study of Arbitration
Clauses in Consumer and Nonconsumer Contracts, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 871, 876 (2008)
(documenting significantly higher use of arbitration clauses in consumer and employment
contracts than in commercial contracts); Richard C. Reuben, Constitutional Gravity: A Unitary
Theory of Alternative Dispute Resolution and Public Civil Justice, 47 UCLA L. REV. 949, 989
(2000) (referring to “low voluntary usage” of ADR). In addition, Bernstein’s studies of
contracting practices among groups such as diamond wholesalers and cotton growers and
processors emphasize that many industry associations have adopted standard forms that
mandate arbitration of disputes between members. See Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial
Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions,
99 MICH. L. REV. 1724, 1724 (2001) (describing the cotton industry’s default arbitration
provisions); Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations
in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115, 115, 143-57 (1992) (describing the diamond
industry’s preference for arbitration).
34. See Christopher R. Drahozal & Peter B. Rutledge, Contract and Procedure, 94 MARQ.
L. REV. (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 11, 17), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract
=1761407 (examining procedures specified in franchise agreements filed with the Minnesota
Department of Commerce, joint venture agreements filed with the SEC, and credit card
contracts filed with the Federal Reserve Board); see also Demaine & Hensler, supra note 33,
at 65 (reporting proportion of arbitration clauses that permitted some form of interim relief
to be sought from a court and prohibited class actions in arbitration).
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Eisenberg and Miller found that 215 (53 percent) specified a forum
for litigation.35 They further report that only 20 percent of reporting
companies waived the right of trial by jury.36 Marotta-Wurgler’s
study of a sample of 597 software license agreements used in online
transactions yields similar results.37 She found that only 6 percent
of the agreements in her sample included arbitration clauses and 28
percent of them included choice-of-forum clauses—mostly in favor
of the state where the seller was headquartered.38 None of them
contained class action waivers.39 Marotta-Wurgler also found that
larger companies were somewhat more likely to use forum selection
clauses but less likely to use arbitration clauses.40 In these respects,
there was little difference between agreements used in connection
with business-oriented as opposed to consumer-oriented products.
A study by Kapeliuk and Klement of contracts filed with the SEC
found a range of predispute devices, involving venue selection,
choice of law, waiver of the right to jury trial, specification of provisional remedies, agreement to service of process, and extension of
the statute of limitations.41 These data provide insufficient information to form a complete picture of contract procedure and do not
shed much light on how the practice functions in discrete settings,
for example, when terms are freely negotiated rather than adhering
to standard-form contracts.
35. Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey Miller, Ex Ante Choices of Law and Forum: An
Empirical Analysis of Corporate Merger Agreements, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1975, 1987 tbl.2 (2006).
Of those contracts, 23.4 percent specified a federal rather than a state forum. Id. at 2000 n.54.
The forum selected tended to be the state of incorporation of the acquirer, the state in which
the acquirer did business, or the state in which the attorneys for the firm reporting the
transaction were located. Id. at 2011; see also Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The
Flight from Arbitration: An Empirical Study of Ex Ante Clauses in the Contracts of Publicly
Held Companies, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 335, 348, 373-74 (2007) (presenting the results of a study
of international contracts in Form 8-K filings by corporations in 2002 and suggesting a
preference for a judicial, rather than an arbitral, forum).
36. See Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, Do Juries Add Value? Evidence from an
Empirical Study of Jury Trial Waiver Clauses in Large Corporate Contracts, 4 J. EMPIRICAL
LEGAL STUD. 539, 539 (2007).
37. Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, “Unfair” Dispute Resolution Classes: Much Ado About
Nothing?, in BOILERPLATE: THE FOUNDATION OF MARKET CONTRACTS 45, 47-48 (Omri BenShahar ed., 2007).
38. Id.
39. Id. at 48.
40. Id. at 55.
41. Kapeliuk & Klement, supra note 9, at 7-10.
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B. Contract Procedure and Judicial Review
The case law about ex ante contract procedure similarly provides
only a narrow window into the practice, its distribution among cases
and parties, and its specific effects. Ex ante stipulations of this sort
appear to receive only limited judicial review; rather than assess the
fairness or utility of customized procedural terms, many courts
instead tend to acquiesce in these private arrangements.42 This
pattern of acceptance follows a trend that G. Richard Shell identified almost twenty years ago in his study of contracts and the U.S.
Supreme Court: the steady demise of the public-policy exception to
contract enforcement and, in particular, of an exception to contractual autonomy that draws from the special attributes of judicial
process.43
It seems relatively certain that subject-matter jurisdiction
remains a “mandatory” or “immutable” term44—akin to the rules
concerning fraud, duress, and unconscionability—so that a party
cannot agree ex ante to waive a defect in subject-matter jurisdiction.45 In a limited number of situations, the U.S. Supreme
42. See, e.g., Harold H. Bruff, Public Programs, Private Deciders: The Constitutionality of
Arbitration in Federal Programs, 67 TEX. L. REV. 441, 477 (1989). For an example of a state
court taking a tougher approach to ex ante procedural stipulations, see Stevelman, supra note
28, at 118 (discussing the Delaware Court of Chancery’s refusal to accept forum selection
clauses in merger agreements that place litigation involving Delaware corporations in courts
outside Delaware).
43. G. Richard Shell, Contracts in the Modern Supreme Court, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 431, 45256 (1993) (detailing Supreme Court treatment of judicial-access clauses and documenting
judicial acceptance of ex ante forum selection clauses); see also Paul D. Carrington & Paul H.
Haagen, Contract and Jurisdiction, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 331, 402 (tracing the Supreme Court’s
acceptance of arbitration and calling the decisions “a trespass on the institutions of
democratic government”). For the most recent example of the Court’s endorsement of
agreements to arbitrate, even when they disallow classwide proceedings, see AT&T Mobility
L.L.C. v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011) (holding that the Federal Arbitration Act
preempted a California decisional rule that treated class waivers in consumer arbitration
agreements as unconscionable if the agreement was one of adhesion, the damages involved
were likely to be small, and the party with inferior bargaining power alleged a scheme to
defraud).
44. For a definition of the distinction between mandatory and default terms, see Ian Ayres
& Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules,
99 YALE L.J. 87, 87 (1989) (defining mandatory and default rules).
45. See, e.g., Wis. Dep’t of Corr. v. Schacht, 524 U.S. 381, 389 (1998) (“No party can waive
the defect or consent to jurisdiction.”); see Frederic M. Bloom, Jurisdiction’s Noble Lie, 61
STAN. L. REV. 971, 987 (2009) (“Parties may not waive, disguise, or stumble through subject-
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Court has enforced ex post agreements that arguably indirectly
enlarge the subject-matter jurisdiction of the federal courts.46 In
addition, the Court recently held that Federal Rule 17 may be contracted around before litigation in ways that effectively overcome
the core requirement of standing under Article III of the Federal
Constitution.47 However, these departures from the mandatory rule
matter jurisdiction defects.”). It follows that Federal Rule 12(b)(1), governing the presentation
of defenses based on a “lack of subject-matter jurisdiction,” may not be waived or altered by
the parties. Similarly, Federal Rule 12(h), governing the waiving and preserving of defenses,
does not permit litigant choice that goes beyond the limits of Article III of the Federal
Constitution because courts retain the ability to dismiss the action when subject-matter
jurisdiction is lacking. But see Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 101 (1998)
(noting that precedent has “diluted the absolute purity of the rule that Article III jurisdiction
is always an antecedent question” to a decision on the merits); see also Sinochem Int’l Co. v.
Malaysia Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 430-31 (2007) (stating that Steel Co. “clarified
that a federal court generally may not rule on the merits of a case without first determining
that it has jurisdiction over the category of a claim in suit (subject-matter jurisdiction) and
the parties (personal jurisdiction)”); Kevin M. Clermont, Sequencing the Issues for Judicial
Decisionmaking: Limitations from Jurisdictional Primacy and Intrasuit Preclusion, 63 FLA.
L. REV. 301, 314-15 (2011) (arguing that only Article III jurisdictional limits are “on the list
of nonbypassable grounds”). The mandatory nature of subject-matter jurisdiction, including
federal appellate jurisdictional limits, may explain the Court’s treatment of the grounds
available for vacatur under the Federal Arbitration Act. See Hall St. Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc.,
552 U.S. 576 (2008); see also Christopher R. Drahozal, Contracting Around Hall Street, 14
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 905, 918-21 (2010) (discussing the possibility of contracting for state
court review).
46. For example, in Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Epstein, involving a collateral
challenge to a class action settlement on grounds of inadequate representation, the Court
accorded preclusive effect to a state court judgment that encompassed federal claims falling
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal court. 516 U.S. 367, 386-87 (1996). And in
Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, decided that same year, the Court unanimously held that the
absence of diversity jurisdiction at the time of removal was not fatal when such jurisdiction
existed at the time of entry of judgment following a settlement between defendants that
resulted in the dismissing of the nondiverse party from the action. 519 U.S. 61, 64 (1996). In
both of these cases, a settlement between the parties indirectly converted subject-matter
jurisdiction from a mandatory into a default rule, in the sense of allowing the parties’ action
to drive judicial deviation from the decisional rules that govern whether jurisdiction exists.
Subsequently, in Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Global Group, L.P., the Court, dividing five to four,
declined to extend the Caterpillar exception to encompass a partnership’s post-filing change
in citizenship that cured a jurisdictional defect. 541 U.S. 567, 574-75 (2004). In addition, in
Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Insurance Co. of America, the district court’s ancillary jurisdiction
turned on the parties’ inclusion of specific terms in the stipulation of settlement that the court
so ordered. 511 U.S. 375, 381-82 (1994).
47. See Sprint Commc’ns Co. v. APCC Servs., Inc., 554 U.S. 269, 285-86 (2008) (reading
Article III to permit assignees to bring claims when assignee had contractually agreed to pay
proceeds to assignor); Samuel Issacharoff, Private Claims, Aggregate Rights, 2008 SUP. CT.
REV. 183, 191-92 (endorsing the Court’s holding in Sprint despite the absence of class action
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of subject-matter jurisdiction are notable as outliers and so are
regarded as unusual.
Other than Article III requirements, no other federal constitutional provisions cut sharply into contractual autonomy. Due process rights of notice and an opportunity to be heard may be waived
ex ante;48 a cognovit note, by which a debtor consents to judgment
in favor of the holder without notice or hearing, “is not, per se,
violative of Fourteenth Amendment due process.”49 Likewise, the
civil jury right can be waived ex ante.50 Although the Court has
underscored that the standard for reviewing jury waivers is constitutional, not contractual, insisting that the waiver be “voluntary,
knowing, and intelligently made,”51 contractual terms are upheld
even when the facts point to an absence of true assent.52 Thus, other
than subject-matter jurisdiction, the public rules of procedure
function as default rules, akin to the rules of offer and acceptance
that can be altered or customized according to the needs and
preferences of the disputants.53 Exceptions to the default rule are
procedural safeguards when the parties were repeat-player commercial entities).
48. E.g., D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 185 (1972) (“The due process rights
to notice and hearing prior to a civil judgment are subject to waiver.”); Nat’l Equip. Rental,
Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 315-16 (1964) (“[I]t is settled ... that parties to a contract may
agree in advance ... to waive notice altogether.”).
49. Overmyer, 405 U.S. at 187. Justice Douglas emphasized in his concurring opinion that
“[w]hatever procedural hardship the [contractual] ... scheme worked ... was voluntarily and
understandingly self-inflicted through ... arm’s-length bargaining.” Id. at 189 (Douglas, J.,
concurring). But see Note, Cognovit Judgments: Some Constitutional Considerations, 70
COLUM. L. REV. 1118, 1125-29 (1970) (developing constitutional arguments against cognovit
notes).
50. See Thomley, supra note 29, at 133 (discussing the federal standard for endorsing
contractual jury waivers); see also David T. Rusoff, Contractual Jury Waivers: Their Use in
Reducing Lender Liability, 110 BANKING L.J. 4, 9-14 (1993) (presenting policy arguments in
favor of ex ante jury waivers).
51. Overmeyer, 405 U.S. at 185. The Court has stated that “facts are important” to the
constitutional inquiry, and that “where the contract is one of adhesion, where there is great
disparity in bargaining power, and where the debtor receives nothing for the cognovit
provision, other legal consequences may ensue.” Id. at 178, 188.
52. See, e.g., IFC Credit Corp. v. United Bus. & Indus. Fed. Credit Union, 512 F.3d 989,
993 (7th Cir. 2008) (reversing the district court’s refusal to enforce a jury waiver embedded
in a sales contract on the view that “[a]s long as the price is negotiable and the customer may
shop elsewhere, consumer protection comes from competition rather than judicial
intervention”).
53. But see Noyes, supra note 10, at 612 (“[M]ost lawyers and potential litigants do not
think of the rules of litigation as default rules.”).
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associated with specific federal statutes; in addition, some state
courts subject ex ante contractual waivers to heightened scrutiny—
and even ban them in discrete categories of cases.54
The Court’s relaxed acceptance of ex ante contract procedure is
best illustrated by its treatment of forum selection clauses.55 U.S.
courts, like common law courts abroad, traditionally accepted a
defendant’s waiver of objections to personal jurisdiction,56 justified
as a matter of consent. However, U.S. courts treated “ouster”
clauses that withdrew judicial power from the public courts as
unenforceable because “contrary to public policy,”57 and the ouster
concept informed the Court’s analogous rejection of ex ante waivers
of rules of evidence.58 In 1972, the Court in The Bremen v. Zapata
Off-Shore Co. shifted course: it not only ratified an ex ante forum
selection clause, but also called the ouster concept a “vestigial legal
fiction.”59 The Bremen was an admiralty case involving evenly
54. For a statutory exception to the general practice of accepting privately drafted
procedural terms, see Jeremy Jones, Comment, Forum and Venue Selection Clauses in
Seamen’s Employment Contracts: Can Contractual Stipulations Be Used To Defeat a Seaman’s
Choice of Forum or Venue in a Jones Act Claim?, 85 TUL. L. REV. 519, 521-22 (2010)
(discussing prohibition on forum selection clauses in contracts involving the Federal
Employer’s Liability Act). On the state level, California and Georgia treat jury waivers as
unenforceable, citing state constitutional provisions. See Thomley, supra note 29, at 134-38.
But see David F. Johnson, The Enforcement of Contractual Jury Waiver Clauses in Texas, 62
BAYLOR L. REV. 649, 650 (2010) (“Texas courts, and almost all other jurisdictions, have held
that contractual jury waivers are permissible and enforceable under certain circumstances.”).
55. For a comprehensive and critical discussion of these cases, see David Marcus, The
Perils of Contract Procedure: A Revised History of Forum Selection Clauses in the Federal
Courts, 82 TUL. L. REV. 973, 988-1041 (2008).
56. E.g., Nat’l Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 315-16 (1964) (endorsing
consent-to-service clause contained in a contract of adhesion); see also Friedrich K. Juenger,
Supreme Court Validation of Forum-Selection Clauses, 19 WAYNE L. REV. 49, 51 (1972) (“The
ability of private parties to confer jurisdiction by consent has long been recognized in the
English speaking world.”).
57. E.g., Carbon Black Exp., Inc. v. SS Monrosa, 254 F.2d 297, 300-01 (5th Cir. 1958); see
also Vaden v. Discover Bank, 129 S. Ct. 1262, 1274-75 (2009) (discussing the out-moded view
that “arbitration clauses [were] unworthy attempts to ‘oust’ [courts] of jurisdiction”); Juenger,
supra note 56, at 51-54 (discussing the history of the ouster doctrine).
58. See Note, Contracts To Alter the Rules of Evidence, 46 HARV. L. REV. 138, 142 (1932)
(discussing “a deep rooted prejudice” against ouster agreements and their application to bar
ex ante waivers of evidence rules).
59. 407 U.S. 1, 12 (1972). Even earlier, courts of appeals had begun to question the ouster
concept in cases involving forum selection clauses. See, e.g., Cent. Contracting Co. v. Md. Cas.
Co., 367 F.2d 341, 345 (3d Cir. 1966) (“[S]uch a provision does not oust the jurisdiction of the
courts; in effect it merely constitutes a stipulation in which the parties join in asking the court
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matched commercial companies doing work in international waters;
under the Court’s new approach, a forum clause that was freely
negotiated would be enforced unless “unreasonable and unjust, or
that the clause was invalid for such reasons as fraud or overreaching.”60 The Court later extended this analysis, at least in admiralty
cases, to consumer contracts,61 and soon after federal courts sitting
in diversity and many state courts began to follow suit.62 The fact
that the forum selection clause appeared as an adhesive term in a
standard-form contract generally provided no defense to the term’s
enforcement.63 Diversity cases have produced a somewhat more
complicated doctrinal approach, at least with respect to venueselection clauses: 28 U.S.C. § 1404, the federal statute governing
transfer of venue, trumps any conflicting state procedural rule.64
to give effect to their agreement by declining to exercise its jurisdiction.”).
60. The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 15.
61. See, e.g., Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 593 (1991).
62. See Manetti-Farrow, Inc. v. Gucci Am., Inc., 858 F.2d 509, 512 (9th Cir. 1988)
(“Although The Bremen was an admiralty case, its standard has been widely applied to forum
selection clauses in general.”); Bense v. Interstate Battery Sys. of Am., Inc., 683 F.2d 718, 721
(2d Cir. 1982) (stating that although The Bremen “arose in an international context, we see
no reason why this should preclude the application of The Bremen Court’s reasoning to
domestic suits”); see also Michael D. Moberly & Carolyn F. Burr, Enforcing Forum Selection
Clauses in State Court, 39 SW. L. REV. 265, 276 (2009) (“Although Bremen arose under the
federal courts’ admiralty jurisdiction, the Supreme Court’s analysis had an enormous
influence on the enforceability of forum selection clauses in subsequent state court litigation.”
(internal citation omitted)); Linda S. Mullenix, Another Choice of Forum, Another Choice of
Law: Consensual Adjudicatory Procedure in Federal Court, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 291, 307
(1988) (“The current doctrine of consensual adjudicatory procedure enforced throughout the
federal court system is based on Supreme Court pronouncements in The Bremen.”); Jonathan
L. Corsico, Comment, Forum Non Conveniens: A Vehicle for Federal Court Enforcement of
Forum Selection Clauses that Name Non-Federal Forums as Proper, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1853,
1863 (2003) (“Under the Bremen test, the forum selection clause is afforded almost dispositive
weight.”).
63. In Carnival Cruise, the Court ratified use of a forum selection clause in a standard
contract between a large company and an elderly consumer who did not see the term before
agreeing to the deal, holding that such provisions presumptively are acceptable. 499 U.S. at
593-94. This result ran counter to conflicts principles that withheld respect from private rules
embedded in what Albert Ehrenzweig called “true adhesion contracts between unequal
parties.” Albert A. Ehrenzweig, Adhesion Contracts in the Conflict of Laws, 53 COLUM. L. REV.
1072, 1076 (1953). Professor Ehrenzweig emphasized, “Whatever the status of the principle
of party autonomy in the conflicts law of contracts in general, this principle has no place in
the conflicts law of adhesion contracts.” Id. at 1090; see also Patrick J. Borchers, Forum
Selection Agreements in the Federal Courts After Carnival Cruise: A Proposal for
Congressional Reform, 67 WASH. L. REV. 55, 90 (1992).
64. See Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 32 (1988) (applying federal law in
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Although this approach may appear to limit contractual autonomy,65
in practice the federal test treats party agreements as effective even
when a state court would withhold enforcement.66
II. CONTRACT PROCEDURE AS A PRIVATE CONCERN
Although a few commentators have raised questions about the
public impact of contract procedure, most of the debate over whether
to permit the practice is concerned with its effects on the immediate
parties to the contract.67 Some commentators approach the issue
from an economic perspective and ask whether the parties are likely
to be better off than before they entered into the contract. Others
ask whether the benefits and burdens of the transaction are fairly
a diversity action to determine the validity of a contractual forum selection clause designating
venue and holding that a case could be transferred under federal law pursuant to a
contractual venue clause unenforceable under state law); see also Allan R. Stein, Erie and
Court Access, 100 YALE L.J. 1935, 1961-68 (1991) (criticizing the Stewart rationale).
65. See Maryellen Corna, Note, Confusion and Dissension Surrounding the Venue Transfer
Statutes, 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 319, 324 (1992) (positing that the Stewart Court limited The Bremen
and so “limited parties’ rights to contract for venue, and, by analogy, limited their ability to
waive litigation rights”).
66. See Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Geography as a Litigation Weapon: Consumers, ForumSelection Clauses, and the Rehnquist Court, 40 UCLA L. REV. 423, 458 (1992) (explaining that
Stewart “has the effect of making forum selection clauses generally enforceable in federal
diversity actions even when the suit is heard in a state whose law refuses to enforce such
clauses”). Whether state or federal law governs motions to dismiss on the basis of a venue
selection clause remains an open question on which the circuits are divided. See Don Zupanec,
Forum Selection Clause—Diversity Action—Governing Law, 25 FED. LITIGATOR 32, 32-33
(2010) (discussing circuit division on this issue); see also Ryan T. Holt, Note, A Uniform
System for the Enforceability of Forum Selection Clauses in Federal Courts, 62 VAND. L. REV.
1913, 1945-51 (2009) (urging adoption of a federal rule to govern motions to dismiss and
motions to transfer to enforce a forum selection clause in cases heard by a federal court sitting
in diversity).
67. But see Resnik, supra note 2, at 799, 802 (predicting that contract procedure will have
corrosive effects on the “public dimensions” of dispute resolution); see also Dodge, supra note
9, at 770-83; Kapeliuk & Klement, supra note 9, at 38-44; Judith Resnik, Uncovering,
Disclosing, and Discovering How the Public Dimensions of Court-Based Processes Are at Risk,
81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 521, 549 (2006). For a “public justice” approach to ex ante arbitration
agreements, see Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is It Just?, 57 STAN. L.
REV. 1631, 1661-75 (2005) (summarizing and expanding a “public justice” critique with respect
to mandatory arbitration), and Richard C. Reuben, Democracy and Dispute Resolution: The
Problem of Arbitration, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 279, 297 (2004). For other commentary
recognizing the third-party negative effects of contract procedure, see Charles L. Knapp,
Taking Contracts Private: The Quiet Revolution in Contract Law, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 761,
780-89 (2002). See generally Mullenix, supra note 62; Shell, supra note 43.
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distributed between the parties. Still others ask whether enforcing
the procedural terms of a contract manifests due respect for the
parties’ autonomy.
A. Efficiency
Some commentators ask whether enforcing ex ante agreements
on procedural matters can be justified by the general principle that
the law should encourage and facilitate agreements that contemplate mutually beneficial—or, as the economists say, Pareto-efficient
—exchanges and discourage other agreements.68 Defenders of contract procedure thus invoke the general presumption that voluntary
agreements concluded by competent parties will be mutually beneficial. But there are several specific reasons to believe that the
parties to a contract might benefit sufficiently from avoiding statesupplied procedural rules to offset the transaction costs entailed in
creating a customized regime.69 For instance, terms that specify the
location in which disputes will be resolved can allow parties to
minimize travel costs. Contractual provisions to curtail discovery
might make sense, for example, in disputes that are expected to
turn on a court’s interpretation of a limited number of documents.
Similarly, waivers of notice and hearing rights might be rationalized
by the benefits of shared cost savings. Terms that designate a bench
trial allow parties to choose adjudicators with professional expertise
and avoid any additional delay or uncertainty associated with jury
trials. Terms that provide for confidential proceedings allow parties
to protect sensitive trade secrets. Terms that restrict class actions
68. See Clark, supra note 13, at 1706 (“To sum up the strong form of the contractual
theory in a motto: Everything is negotiable.”); see also STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 446-47 (2004) (arguing that if parties to a contract both agree to
have a private system resolve contractual problems that may arise “it must make each of
them better off”); Moffitt, supra note 6, at 484 (“The litigants would only proceed with the
search for customization as long as both litigants saw reason to continue.”).
69. Scott & Triantis, supra note 22, at 856 (arguing that in many cases contract procedure
improves cost-effectiveness of contract enforcement). This argument dominates favorable
discussion of ex ante arbitration agreements. E.g., Steven Shavell, Alternative Dispute
Resolution: An Economic Analysis, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 9 (1995) (positing with respect to ex
ante arbitration agreements that because the legal system cannot be made sensitive to the
needs of every litigant, the “parties should be able to choose for themselves a better method
of dispute resolution than the legal process would offer”).
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allow parties to forestall frivolous litigation initiated by selfinterested attorneys.
More generally, adopting clear procedural terms when the procedural law that would otherwise be applicable is unclear may allow
parties to reduce their litigation costs.70 In addition, adopting a
single set of procedural terms across all their agreements allows
parties who are exposed to litigation in multiple jurisdictions to
avoid the costs of learning multiple bodies of procedural law and the
litigation costs already mentioned.71 Finally, the cost of customization will predictably decline over time as later users free-ride on
existing private terms.72 For all of these reasons, efficiency arguments suggest that courts and contracting parties alike ought to
embrace procedural terms.
Critics of contract procedure resist accepting the presumption of
an efficient exchange when there is reason to believe that one party
to the agreement has inadequate information.73 Concerns about
inadequate information are particularly salient when individuals
enter into standard-form contracts with business enterprises without any reasonable opportunity to consult an attorney.74 The idea
70. See Larry E. Ribstein, From Efficiency to Politics in Contractual Choice of Law, 37 GA.
L. REV. 363, 366 (2003) (“Enforcing contract provisions that choose the law that applies to the
contract can be efficient because these clauses reduce the uncertainty of vague conflict-of-laws
default rules and help contracting parties avoid the application of inefficient mandatory
rules.”). The significance of this factor may vary in different contexts. See Bruce H. Kobayashi
& Larry E. Ribstein, Delaware for Small Fry: Jurisdictional Competition for Limited Liability
Companies, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 91, 136 (finding that court quality is the most important
factor in allowing states to retain and attract LLCs, taking account of firm size, statutory
flexibility, statutory innovation, and debtor protection). For a discussion of procedural
uncertainty with respect to juries, see Valerie P. Hans & Theodore Eisenberg, The
Predictability of Juries, 60 DEPAUL L. REV. 375, 390 (2011) (finding that the punitive damage
variable bore the strongest relationship to jury predictability judgments).
71. E.g., The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1972) (endorsing this
rationale); see Giesela Rühl, Methods and Approaches in Choice of Law: An Economic
Perspective, 24 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 801, 812 (2006) (discussing efficiency gains of forum
selection clauses).
72. See Steven R. Salbu, Evolving Contract as a Device for Flexible Coordination and
Control, 34 AM. BUS. L.J. 329, 376-77 (1997).
73. See Dodge, supra note 9, at 758-64; see also Shmuel I. Becher, A “Fair Contracts”
Approval Mechanism: Reconciling Consumer Contracts and Conventional Contract Law, 42
U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 747, 748 (2009).
74. Taylor & Cliffe, supra note 8, at 1118 (“It is this concern for whether all parties to the
agreement know and appreciate the effect of the agreement that is at the heart of concern for
the judicial rush to embrace [procedural provisions].”). See generally Oren Bar-Gill, The
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that those individuals will not understand the terms of their
contracts is particularly plausible when it comes to procedural
terms, because those terms often relate to subjects that no one other
than a trial lawyer is likely to understand.75 Moreover, because a
procedural term often is embedded in a contract with other boilerplate terms, the practice of contract procedure raises a set of
concerns associated with adhesion contracts generally.76 As a general matter, U.S. contract law is reluctant to bind parties to terms,
especially material ones, that the parties reasonably failed to
understand.77 This principle serves to protect parties who reasonably can argue either that they were unaware of material terms set
out in their agreement or that they failed to understand the import
of those terms. It also serves to encourage contracting parties to
take reasonable steps to ensure that their counterparties are aware
of and understand all of the material terms of the agreement. These
Behavioral Economics of Consumer Contracts, 92 MINN. L. REV. 749 (2008) (discussing, in the
context of the credit card market, evidence of consumers’ systematic errors and
misperceptions).
75. See Michael I. Meyerson, The Efficient Consumer Form Contract: Law and Economics
Meets the Real World, 24 GA. L. REV. 583, 585 (1990) (establishing that a “special characteristic” of consumer form contracts is the fact “that one party, the consumer, typically lacks
information concerning the terms of the contract”); see also Dodge, supra note 9, at 759.
76. See Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion—Some Thoughts About Freedom of
Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 632 (1943) (“The weaker party, in need of the goods or
services, is frequently not in a position to shop around for better terms, either because the
author of the standard contract has a monopoly (natural or artificial) or because all
competitors use the same clauses.”); see also Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, The Unconscionability
Game: Strategic Judging and the Evolution of Federal Arbitration Law, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1420, 1481 (2008) (distinguishing arguments that an arbitration clause is unconscionable “and
a general charge that the entire contract was adhesionary”); Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of
Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1173, 1176 (1983) (arguing that “the
form terms present in contracts of adhesion ought to be considered presumptively (although
not absolutely) unenforceable”).
77. See Cass R. Sunstein, A New Progressivism, 17 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 197, 219 n.52
(2006) (arguing that government regulation of contractual terms as a response to “inadequate
information ... may well make sense”). Debates about the enforcement of ex ante arbitration
agreements raise questions about whether inadequate and asymmetrical information ought
to be grounds for nonenforcement. Compare Christopher R. Drahozal, “Unfair” Arbitration
Clauses, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 695, 765 (arguing for enforcement despite the fact that
“individuals often will be poorly informed relative to corporations”), with Jean R. Sternlight,
Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme Court’s Preference for Binding
Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637, 689 (1996) (urging nonenforcement given the fact that “the
marginal cost of obtaining information about a particular contractual clause may exceed the
expected marginal benefit from such information”).
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outcomes are—at least arguably—fair, efficient, and consistent with
the idea that contract law should give effect only to truly autonomous decisions to assume contractual obligations.
Nonetheless, in many cases one would have to stretch traditional
principles of contract law to justify striking down procedural terms
on the basis of concerns about inadequate or even asymmetrical
information. Consumers and employees often have at least as much
information about the procedural terms of their agreements as they
do about substantive terms, such as termination rights, that seem
just as material; yet the substantive terms are routinely enforced,
at least in the absence of evidence of fraud or a determination that
the terms are substantively unconscionable.78 The opposing view—
what Professors Calabresi and Melamed famously termed “self
paternalism”79—has not gained traction in discussions about
contract procedure.80 It also is important to recognize that concerns
about inadequate or asymmetrical information in contracting generally ought to diminish over time as reliance upon certain types of
procedural boilerplate becomes more commonplace, resulting in
changes in contracting parties’ knowledge and expectations.81
B. Substantive Fairness
Sometimes the debate about contract procedure is framed in
terms of fairness. The question typically posed is whether particular
procedural terms run afoul of the doctrine of unconscionability.82
78. See, e.g., William L. Corbett, Arbitrating Employment Law Disputes, 68 MONT. L. REV.
415, 431 (2007).
79. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1113-14 (1972); see also
Douglas G. Baird, The Boilerplate Puzzle, 104 MICH. L. REV. 933, 942-47 (2006) (discussing
a theory of weak paternalism as applied to boilerplate contract terms).
80. See generally W. David Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control
of Lawmaking Power, 84 HARV. L. REV. 529 (1971) (setting out the argument for review in
such circumstances).
81. See Moffitt, supra note 6, at 515 (“With arbitration, a relatively small set of
standardized deviations has become popular and is routinely incorporated by reference.”). But
see Horton, supra note 4, at 609 (arguing that unilateral modification of ex ante procedural
terms makes “market discipline” impossible). In addition, “idiosyncratic” customized terms
may reduce cost benefits to third parties. See Joshua Fairfield, The Cost of Consent: Optimal
Standardization in the Law of Contract, 58 EMORY L.J. 1401, 1431-32 (2009).
82. See, e.g., Lee Goldman, My Way and the Highway: The Law and Economics of Choice
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Supporters of contract procedure claim that it makes litigants better
off than the alternatives and so is compatible with contract law’s
minimum standards of substantive fairness. The counter is that
those terms sometimes unfairly prejudice the interests of one party
to a contract. The clearest examples are terms that are so prejudicial to one party that, looking at the matter at the time of the
contract, it is clear that the party would have been better off not
entering into the transaction.83 In practice, the procedural terms
that seem to raise concerns about unfairness include forum selection
clauses that require plaintiffs to travel broad distances to litigate
their claims; clauses that waive rights to participate in class actions
in situations in which no other mode of proceeding is viable given
the small stakes of each claim; and, more generally, any procedural
term that effectively deprives one party of the ability to vindicate
nonwaivable statutory rights.84 These kinds of terms are particularly troubling when they are poorly understood.85
As with criticisms of contract procedure that question the efficiency rationale, criticisms drawn from arguments about substantive fairness narrow the inquiry to the parties to the agreement.
C. Litigant Autonomy
The debate about whether to permit contract procedure also
implicates whether it is appropriate for the government to regulate
an individual’s autonomous litigation decisions in favor of goals that
are exogenous to the party’s immediate self-interest.86 As William
of Forum Clauses in Consumer Form Contracts, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 700, 700-01 (1992) (arguing
that adhesive forum selection clauses should be presumptively unenforceable as
unconscionable); see also Mo Zhang, Contractual Choice of Law in Contracts of Adhesion and
Party Autonomy, 41 AKRON L. REV. 123, 129 (2008) (“[A]s a general rule, a choice of law clause
in an adhesion contract shall be presumed ineffective.”).
83. For an alternative approach to defining substantive fairness, see James Gordley,
Equality in Exchange, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 1587, 1588 (1981) (proposing that contract law should
provide relief from unequal exchanges, typically defined as exchanges on terms that deviate
substantially from competitive market prices).
84. Dodge, supra note 9, at 724-34 (identifying the risk of procedural terms being used to
derogate from nonwaivable rights).
85. On the other hand, there is often room for arguing that the risks created by procedural
terms are offset by benefits embodied in other terms of the contract.
86. See Amanda Frost, The Limits of Advocacy, 59 DUKE L.J. 447, 449 (2009) (“Party
control over case presentation is a central tenet of the American adversarial legal system.”).
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B. Rubenstein puts it, “Civil procedure’s private law orientation
conceptualizes litigation decisions as individual ‘rights’ to be protected from governmental or centralized community control.”87 The
private law model of adjudication embraces a contractarian view of
litigant choice and presumes that the parties are able to make
voluntary and informed litigation choices,88 notwithstanding differences in litigant identity and resource capability.89 The individualist model associates litigant choice with expressive values and also
views adjudicative participation as an essential feature of democratic self-governance.90 Apart from decisions affecting mandatory
features of the adversary system—the structural limits of subjectmatter jurisdiction in courts defined by Article III of the Federal
Constitution—individuals are afforded a broad range of discretion
in deciding which litigation choices to make and which to avoid.91
Far from undermining the integrity of the litigation system, ex ante
contract procedure instead is said to bolster the autonomous
decisions that adversarialism requires.92 Within this framework
individuals are free to waive legal protections, assuming their
decisions are voluntary and informed. As Judge Easterbrook has

87. William B. Rubenstein, Divided We Litigate: Addressing Disputes Among Group
Members and Lawyers in Civil Rights Campaigns, 106 YALE L.J. 1623, 1644 (1997).
88. The structural features of the private law model of adjudication are described in
Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1976).
See also Issacharoff, supra note 47, at 203 (“For Chayes, the critical feature of a common law
litigation was that it emerged from the autonomous conduct of the parties to the dispute.”).
89. See Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court and Litigation Access Fees: The Right To
Protect One’s Rights—Part I, 1973 DUKE L.J. 1153, 1163 (discussing the “equipage” needed
to participate fully in litigation); see also Helen Hershkoff, Poverty Law and Civil Procedure:
Rethinking the First-Year Course, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1325, 1328-39 (2007) (discussing
adjudication and party wealth).
90. See Rubenstein, supra note 87, at 1645 (“Individuals can express themselves through
the conflicts that they formalize into litigation and through the manner in which they wage
these conflicts. By fostering this self-definition, individualism promotes engagement and
avoids the alienation that can result when decisions are yielded to experts.”); see also Helen
Hershkoff, State Courts and the “Passive Virtues”: Rethinking the Judicial Function, 114
HARV. L. REV. 1833, 1917 (2001) (discussing litigation choice and democratic processes).
91. See Moffitt, supra note 6, at 503-05 (discussing constitutional and statutory limits on
ex ante contract procedure and observing that “the laws creating the courts and their
procedures serve as an outer limit on the customization options for litigants”).
92. See id. at 479 (arguing that customized procedure supports procedural justice by
giving litigants a “voice” in the design of dispute mechanisms).
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explained, “One aspect of personal liberty is the entitlement to
exchange statutory rights for something valued more highly.”93
The private model of litigant autonomy is conceptually allied with
an instrumental view of procedure: adjective law is the mere handmaid of substance and assumed to be value neutral and without
substantive effect.94 From this perspective, a forum selection clause
is presumed to affect only where a dispute is resolved, not how the
dispute will be resolved,95 and so does not implicate autonomy
concerns.96
D. Fair Process
Another perspective on contract procedure looks to the fairness
of the agreed procedure.97 Although the literature does not clearly
state what the appropriate criteria of fairness might be,98 a typical
view is that a fair process is efficient, in the sense of minimizing the
sum of error costs and the costs of operating the procedural system,
although the literature tends to emphasize overall costs to the
litigant making the customized rule change.99 Some commentators
93. Metro E. Ctr. for Conditioning & Health v. Qwest Commc’ns Int’l, Inc., 294 F.3d 924,
929 (7th Cir. 2002). But see Safranek v. Copart, Inc., 379 F. Supp. 2d 927 (N.D. Ill. 2005)
(declining to enforce arbitration provision’s waiver of recovery fees as violative of federal law).
For a criticism of the Seventh Circuit’s approach to the issue, see generally Kathryn A.
Sabbeth & David C. Vladeck, Contracting (Out) Rights, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 803 (2009).
94. See, e.g., Charles E. Clark, The Handmaid of Justice, 23 WASH. U. L.Q. 297, 297
(1938). But see Daniel Markovits, Arbitration’s Arbitrage: Social Solidarity at the Nexus of
Adjudication and Contract, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 431, 452 (2010) (“[T]he transparent view of
adjudication is in fact mistaken, a vestige of a formalist jurisprudence that is now
discredited.”); see also Dodge, supra note 9, at 729 (“[P]arties can strategically contract to
manipulate substantive law and outcomes in a far more fundamental way than previously
recognized.”).
95. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628
(1985); see also David Marcus, The Past, Present, and Future of Trans-Substantivity in Federal
Civil Procedure, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 371, 379 (2010) (discussing the argument that transsubstantive procedural rules are value free).
96. Metro E., 294 F.3d at 927.
97. This reflects an outcome-based as opposed to a process-based understanding of
procedural fairness. See Robert G. Bone, Agreeing to Fair Process: The Problem with
Contractarian Theories of Procedural Fairness, 83 B.U. L. REV. 485, 509-11 (2003).
98. Id. at 488-89.
99. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 549 (4th ed. 1992) (stating that
the objective of a procedural system is to reduce the cost of erroneous judicial decisions and
the cost of operating the procedural system).
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do question whether systemic efficiencies will result from contract
procedure, suggesting that the practice may increase costs to the
public judicial budget if the parties stipulate to processes that
exceed in significant ways the public system’s existing way of doing
business. Michael L. Moffitt uses the somewhat fantastic example
of an ex ante term contemplating fact-finding by “a jury of 100
jurors,” positing that “the public’s subsidies are generally capped
and are not a function of private litigants’ decisions.”100 However, we
do not have strong empirical evidence one way or the other to decide
whether the practice achieves fair process in the sense of reduced
costs to the parties or to the system overall.
III. THE PUBLIC DIMENSION OF CONTRACT PROCEDURE
In this Part we broaden the analytic focus to consider the system
effects of contract procedure: we claim that contract procedure
entails a transfer of public power to private contract drafters
without an adequate specification of the service to be provided;
without a mechanism for monitoring the outsourced relation; and
without the accountability that competition is expected to bring. The
interests of third parties in the structure and operation of the
state-sponsored civil courts are affected by the outsourced relation,
and it is these interests—not fully accounted for in the existing
literature—that justify scrutiny of, and possibly even interference
with, private parties’ attempts to specify procedural norms by
contract. Commentators have paid attention to the negative thirdparty effects of ex ante arbitration agreements and ex post settlement decrees. By contrast, procedure drafted in anticipation of litigation for use in the public courts has largely evaded scrutiny; we
see this omission as a part of the problem that the practice
presents.101
100. Moffitt, supra note 6, at 508.
101. There are some important exceptions to this statement. For example, Elizabeth
Thornburg discusses whether contract procedure affects the production of public goods,
including various forms of information. Thornburg, supra note 6, at 207. Michael L. Moffitt
discusses the issue of whether contract procedure protects people who are not parties to the
contract and uses the example of a procedural waiver of the appointment of a guardian ad
litem for an infant nonparty. Moffitt, supra note 6, at 506-13. However, no commentator so
far has treated the practice of contract procedure as a form of outsourcing that both captures
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A. Contract Procedure and Outsourcing
Our claim is that contract procedure entails the de facto privatization of an important government function—the outsourcing of the
development of rules of procedure for the public courts. Outsourcing
is a form of privatization that delegates a government function to a
market actor, rather than eliminating the function outright from the
government’s portfolio.102 The practice seeks to capture the benefits
of flexibility, innovation, and reduced costs that can result when
discrete functions are “split” rather than “lumped” together in one
firm.103 Outsourcing can take a variety of forms, but every version
shares a common goal: the government’s indirect provision of goods
or services that are designed, manufactured, or otherwise produced
by a market actor.104 Outsourcing usually relies on a contractual
relation between the government and a private actor.105 As Paul R.
Verkuil explains, this form of privatization “accepts the need for a
government activity but sees advantages in shifting its operation to
private hands.”106

and undermines important state functions for private ends. Dodge argues that the system
effects of ex ante and ex post contract procedure are identical. Dodge, supra note 9, at 35. She
goes on to suggest that such effects are appropriately dealt with by subjecting ex ante and ex
post contract procedure to the same constraints. Id. at 52. We do not necessarily disagree with
this view, but we believe that additional information is required to determine what
constraints should be imposed on either set of practices.
102. See DONAHUE, supra note 3, at 215 (explaining that privatization embraces two
distinct concepts: “removing certain responsibilities, activities, or assets from the collective
realm” and “retaining collective financing but delegating delivery to the private sector”).
103. See John D. Donahue, The Transformation of Government Work: Causes,
Consequences, and Distortions, in GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT: OUTSOURCING AND AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY 41, 42-44 (Jody Freeman & Martha Minow eds., 2009) (discussing outsourcing
as a way to disaggregate the value chain).
104. See Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1367, 1370
(2003) (referring to “government use of private entities to implement government programs
or to provide services to others on the government’s behalf”).
105. See Stan Soloway & Alan Chvotkin, Federal Contracting in Context: What Drives It,
How To Improve It, in GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT: OUTSOURCING AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY,
supra note 103, at 195.
106. PAUL R. VERKUIL, OUTSOURCING SOVEREIGNTY: WHY PRIVATIZATION OF GOVERNMENT
FUNCTIONS THREATENS DEMOCRACY AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT 7 (2007).
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1. Dispute Resolution as an Inherently Governmental Function
Describing contract procedure as outsourcing presumes that
dispute-resolution services constitute an inherently governmental
function, the touchstone for privatization decisions, and that the
practice entails the delegation of an aspect of sovereignty to private
contract drafters. Controversies about privatization often involve
disagreements about whether a particular activity is public or
private.107 Those activities that involve “inherently governmental
functions”108 because they pertain to the setting of policy or the production of public goods are considered to be inappropriate subjects
for private delegation.109 One of President Obama’s early initiatives
was to issue a Presidential Memorandum directed at curtailing
outsourcing that involves inherently governmental activities.110
107. See Scott M. Sullivan, Private Force/Public Goods, 42 CONN. L. REV. 853, 857 (2010)
(“The controversy inherent to privatization largely flows from a difficulty in identifying a
definitive line separating core public responsibilities.”). As Martha Minow explains, these
disagreements “contribute to ambiguity over what can or should be outsourced.” Martha
Minow, Outsourcing Power: How Privatizing Military Efforts Challenges Accountability,
Professionalism, and Democracy, 46 B.C. L. REV. 989, 1015 (2005).
108. See Office of Fed. Procurement Policy (OFPP), Policy Letter 11-01, Performance of
Inherently Governmental and Critical Functions, 76 Fed. Reg. 56,227-42 (Sept. 12, 2011). An
inherently governmental function is “a function that is so intimately related to the public
interest as to require performance by Federal Government employees.” Id. at 56,236. The
Policy Letter goes on to say, “The term includes functions that require either the exercise of
discretion in applying Federal Government authority or the making of value judgments in
making decisions for the Federal Government.” Id. Furthermore, “An inherently
governmental function involves, among other things, the interpretation and execution of the
laws of the United States so as … to significantly affect the life, liberty, or property of private
persons.” Id. An appendix to OFPP Policy Letter 11-01 provides an “illustrative list” of
functions considered to be inherently governmental, including the “performance of
adjudicatory functions (other than those relating to arbitration or other methods of
alternative dispute resolution).” Id. at 56,240.
109. Soloway & Chvotkin, supra note 105, at 220 (discussing the concept “inherently
governmental”); see also Paul R. Verkuil, Public Law Limitations on Privatization of
Government Functions, 84 N.C. L. REV. 397, 421-32 (discussing federal restrictions on
outsourcing).
110. Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies (Mar. 4, 2009),
74 Fed. Reg. 9755, 9755-56 (Mar. 6, 2009) (“[T]he line between inherently governmental
activities that should not be outsourced and commercial activities that may be subject to
private sector competition has been blurred and inadequately defined. As a result, contractors
may be performing inherently governmental functions. Agencies and departments must
operate under clear rules prescribing when outsourcing is and is not appropriate.”); see
Edward Rubin, The Possibilities and Limitations of Privatization, 123 HARV. L. REV. 890, 89293 (2010) (book review) (discussing the Presidential Memorandum).
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We elide the categorization difficulty by taking a pragmatic view:
even if no particular function is inherently governmental,111 dispute
resolution in the public courts can comfortably be viewed as a
governmental function in the United States today.112 The Federal
Constitution identifies courts as a feature of governance; state
constitutions further support the public nature of judicial activity;
and significant tax dollars are devoted to this service. Moreover, the
development of rules of procedure for public courts involves discretionary policymaking that implicates constitutional and statutory
concerns; such policymaking is likewise underwritten by public tax
dollars; and the rules that are devised control the decision making
of public judicial officials affecting liberty, property, and social
order.113 The federal rulemaking process traces to the Rules
Enabling Act, works through the Judicial Conference of the United
States and its Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and
Procedure, and is ratified both by Congress and the Supreme
Court.114 In the usual course, the process for creating rules of procedure is arduous, and—without overly romanticizing it—is credited
with important democratic benefits.115 Indeed, commentators reg-

111. See Rubin, supra note 110, at 895 (“[T]here are no particular sets of functions or
responsibilities that are inherently public.”); see also RAYMOND GEUSS, PUBLIC GOODS,
PRIVATE GOODS 85 (2001) (discussing the “relative” distinction between public and private as
it affects analysis of government decisions to privatize public functions).
112. See Oscar G. Chase, American “Exceptionalism” and Comparative Procedure, 50 AM.
J. COMP. L. 277, 278 (2002) (“[T]he ‘official’ status of ... [disputing] rules reflects the sense that
they are the right way to proceed when significant matter[s] are at stake and cannot be
worked out privately.”).
113. See generally Robert G. Bone, The Process of Making Process: Court Rulemaking,
Democratic Legitimacy, and Procedural Efficacy, 87 GEO. L.J. 887, 919-32 (1999) (discussing
competing U.S. models of public rulemaking and the current ascendancy of the court model).
114. See Peter G. McCabe, Renewal of the Federal Rulemaking Process, 44 AM. U. L. REV.
1655, 1664-75 (1995) (describing the federal rulemaking process). Judge Mark R. Kravitz
describes the federal rulemaking process as “slow, deliberate and utterly transparent—and
purposely so.... ‘Today’s process requires more steps to amend a Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure than it does to amend the U.S. Constitution.’” Mark R. Kravitz, To Revise, or Not
To Revise: That Is the Question, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 213, 216 (2010) (quoting Stephen C.
Yeazell, Judging Rules, Ruling Judges, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 229, 235 (1998)).
115. Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 130 S. Ct. 599, 609 (2009) (“[T]he rulemaking
process has important virtues. It draws on the collective experience of bench and bar, and it
facilitates the adoption of measured, practical solutions.” (citation omitted)).
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ister concern when judges use inherent authority to create procedural rules that circumvent the formal rulemaking process.116
2. Outsourcing Can Be a Planned or De Facto Regulatory
Practice
The government’s decision to outsource can be “planned” or “de
facto.”117 Planned outsourcing takes place within a regulated process
that calls for planning, publicity, solicitation, competitive offers,
evaluation, and accountability mechanisms.118 Planned outsourcing
thus is easy to identify; in its most familiar form, legislation
establishes a policy, and an administrative agency chooses to carry
out the mandate through publicly developed market-based devices
or through service-delivery contracts with private providers.119
Examples include a municipality hiring a private sanitation company to remove trash or the federal government procuring helicopters from private defense contractors. In these settings, the contract
between the government and the private company specifies the good
or service to be provided, the government monitors the private
company’s performance, and competition is expected to generate an
efficient outcome.120 In addition, government contracts can include
clauses that protect individual rights, provide for access to information, and prohibit discrimination.121
116. See, e.g., Samuel P. Jordan, Situating Inherent Power Within a Rules Regime, 87
DENV. U. L. REV. 311, 318-19 (2010) (raising concerns about “the use of inherent authority to
bypass the requirements reflected in ... rulemaking”); Elizabeth T. Lear, Congress, the Federal
Courts, and Forum Non Conveniens: Friction on the Frontier of the Inherent Power, 91 IOWA
L. REV. 1147, 1148 (2006) (criticizing the “inherent powers” justification for judicial treatment
of forum non conveniens as a housekeeping rule).
117. See ALFRED C. AMAN, JR., THE DEMOCRACY DEFICIT: TAMING GLOBALIZATION THROUGH
LAW REFORM 87 (2004).
118. See Mathew Blum, The Federal Framework for Competing Commercial Work Between
the Public and Private Sectors, in GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT: OUTSOURCING AND AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY, supra note 103, at 63-89.
119. Id. at 63-65 (discussing legislative, administrative, and contract-based privatization
and referring to the latter as outsourcing).
120. See DONAHUE, supra note 3, at 44-45 (discussing the importance of specification,
evaluation, and competition to the outsourced activity). Outsourcing is said to work best with
“[c]ommodity jobs—tasks that are well defined, relatively easy to evaluate, and available from
competitive private suppliers.” Id. at 49.
121. See Steven J. Kelman, Achieving Contracting Goals and Recognizing Public Law
Concerns: A Contract Management Perspective, in GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT: OUTSOURCING
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In contrast to planned outsourcing, de facto outsourcing is less
visible, takes a variety of forms, is subject to fewer conventional
oversight mechanisms, and raises the most problematic issues of
accountability and legitimacy. In some settings, the government
directly enters into contracts with private entities or piggybacks on
the activities of private entities to carry out regulatory goals. Thus,
for example, during the federal government’s emergency response
to Hurricane Katrina, private companies such as Walmart and
Home Depot served as food and supply centers.122 In other contexts,
the government licenses or certifies private actors that assist in
monitoring regulatory entities, developing enforcement standards,
and certifying compliance. For example, Massachusetts licenses private professionals to review and approve hazardous waste cleanup
efforts; the scope of the licensed private professional’s work is
defined by a contract with the regulated entity and not with the
Commonwealth.123 As yet another example, the government may
depend on medical determinations made by private physicians or
private facilities to determine payment levels under government
social service programs.124 In this sense, commentators have characterized class action settlements as a form of privatization that
substitutes the litigation decisions of entrepreneurial lawyers for
the policy-making decisions of administrative agencies.125
AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY, supra note 103, at 183 (discussing the benefits and disadvantages

of “contract clauses incorporating public law protections”).
122. See Daniel B. Prieto III, Information Sharing with the Private Sector: History,
Challenges, Innovation, and Prospects, in SEEDS OF DISASTER, ROOTS OF RESPONSE: HOW
PRIVATE ACTION CAN REDUCE PUBLIC VULNERABILITY 404, 405 (Philip E. Auerswald, Lewis
M. Branscomb, Todd M. La Porte & Erwann O. Michel-Kerjan eds., 2006) (discussing the role
of the private sector during Hurricane Katrina in serving as “key distribution points for food,
water, clothing, generators, and other supplies”).
123. See Miriam Seifter, Rent-a-Regulator: Design and Innovation in Environmental
Decision Making, in GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT: OUTSOURCING AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY,
supra note 103, at 93-94 (explaining that the professionals “are not government contractors;
once licensed they are selected and hired by regulated parties”).
124. Gillian Metzger has discussed the Department of Health and Human Services’
reliance on transfer decisions by private nursing homes of Medicaid-eligible patients in
determining the level of support to be provided by the federal government as a form of
privatization of eligibility decisions that otherwise would be made by government personnel
as part of the Medicaid program. Gillian E. Metzger, Private Delegations, Due Process, and
the Duty To Supervise, in GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT: OUTSOURCING AND AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY, supra note 103, at 295 (discussing Yaretsky v. Blum, 457 U.S. 991 (1982)).
125. See Richard A. Nagareda, Turning from Tort to Administration, 94 MICH. L. REV. 899,

2011]

CONTRACTING FOR PROCEDURE

539

In each of these outsourcing settings, the government retains
regulatory authority in an administrative area but indirectly relies
on a private actor to make the discretionary decisions that are the
hallmark of policymaking, as in the class action settlement context;
to carry out compliance review, as in the Massachusetts environmental waste context; or to make eligibility determinations, as in
the Medicaid nursing home context. In some de facto outsourcing
settings the government enters into a contract with the private
entity for the delivery of the good or service. In other settings,
however, the privatized activity is the subject of a contract that is
not between the government and a private actor but rather between
a regulated entity and another private actor, as, for example, in
Massachusetts’s use of licensed private professionals for environmental compliance efforts. De facto outsourcing also includes what
Michael P. Vandenbergh has called “private second-order regulatory
agreements,” defined as contracts between private actors that are
made “in the shadow of public regulations” and enable an administrative agency indirectly to enlist private actors in establishing or
enforcing regulatory standards.126 Finally, whether outsourcing of
a governmental function is carried out in a planned administrative
900-04 (1996); see also Timothy D. Lytton, Using Tort Litigation To Enhance Regulatory Policy
Making: Evaluating Climate-Change Litigation in Light of Lessons from Gun-Industry and
Clergy-Sexual-Abuse Lawsuits, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1837, 1837 (2008) (discussing the role of tort
litigation “to influence regulatory policy”); Wendy Wagner, When All Else Fails: Regulating
Risky Products Through Tort Litigation, 95 GEO. L.J. 693, 694 (2007) (addressing the
argument that “‘regulation through litigation’ ... is often considered to be an illegitimate endrun around the political process rather than a supplemental institutional mechanism for
making products safer”).
126. Michael P. Vandenbergh, The Private Life of Public Law, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 2029,
2030-31 (2005). An example of a second-order agreement is an indemnity contract that shifts
the costs of enforcement from a regulated entity onto another private firm. The contract by
effect deputizes the potential indemnifier as a monitoring and enforcement agent of the
regulated entity’s conduct. Id. at 2049-50. Looking at environmental regulation, Vandenbergh
underscores the range of such agreements—including credit agreements, commercial real
estate agreements, and lease agreements—that incorporate “embedded environmental
provisions” and indirectly deputize firms to “serve many of the functions typically considered
the province of public agencies, including monitoring and enforcement, implementation,
standard setting, and dispute resolution.” Id. at 2045-47. We can add examples: landlordtenant leases that effectively deputize the tenant to monitor the landlord’s compliance with
health and safety requirements, and employment contracts that similarly enlist the employee
to monitor the employer’s compliance with antidiscrimination and workplace conditions rules.
See, e.g., Cynthia L. Estlund, Between Rights and Contract: Arbitration Agreements and NonCompete Covenants as a Hybrid Form of Employment Law, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 379 (2006).
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context or a de facto setting, the practice can make use of either
single or multiple actors. In a single-actor setting, the government
contracts exclusively with one provider; when multiple actors are
involved, significant coordination and oversight issues emerge.
Overall, the combination of practices has made private participation
in public administration pervasive and ubiquitous.127
3. Contract Procedure as De Facto Outsourcing
In our view, contract procedure shares many of the attributes of
de facto outsourcing, in which the private company carries out or
even defines regulatory standards. A contract that includes ex ante
procedural terms simultaneously involves an economic transaction
and a legal act that amends, or at least adapts, the public rules of
procedure in the specific context of any dispute between the
parties.128 The contractual terms govern not only the parties but also
the decision making of government-supplied judges in public courts,
whose decisions, in turn, will affect third parties through enforcement orders, precedent, and the effect of stare decisis. Indeed, every
contractual procedural term, like every public procedural rule,
effectively regulates three distinct relations: that of government to
disputant, that of the disputants inter se, and that of the disputants
to strangers.129 In contrast to planned outsourcing, but typical of de
facto outsourcing, the government stands only as a silent party to
a contract that agrees to customize procedure.130 The terms of the
127. See Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 547
(2000) (“Private participation in governance is neither marginal nor restricted to the
implementation of rules and regulations.”); see also David V. Snyder, Private Lawmaking, 64
OHIO ST. L.J. 371, 443 n.333 (2003) (discussing private lawmaking and raising delegation
questions).
128. See Thornburg, supra note 6, at 206 (“[T]he public court system serves both private
and public functions.”).
129. We rely here on Gunther Teubner’s conceptualization of hybrid contracts as
instantiations of interdiscursive relations. See Gunther Teubner, In the Blind Spot: The
Hybridization of Contracting, 8 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 51, 52-53 (2007) (disaggregating
contracts into economic, productive, and legal acts that transform the economic, legal, and
social context).
130. Cf. Steven Lukes, Invasions of the Market, in FROM LIBERAL VALUES TO DEMOCRATIC
TRANSITION: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF JÁNOS KIS 7, 75 (Ronald Dworkin ed., 2004) (arguing that
“marketization has enabled politicians to divest themselves of responsibility and, crucially,
accountability for the provision of public services”).
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contract circumvent the national rulemaking process, and unlike
procedural stipulations made during the pendency of a lawsuit, ex
ante procedural terms receive little judicial oversight. In an
inversion of Professors Mnookin and Kornhauser’s evocative term
“bargaining in the shadow of the law,”131 contract procedure
produces law in the shadow of bargaining without significant
mechanisms to assure accountability or compliance with public
norms.132
B. Contract Procedure and Negative System Effects
In this Section we argue that there are sound functional reasons
to be concerned about the outsourcing of procedure. Like many
governmental functions, the creation of procedure is an important
way of furthering public goals, including the production of public
goods.133 The virtually unregulated use of contract procedure raises
concerns because of the practice’s predictable negative effects on
adjudication understood as a system of precedent and regulation.134
In particular, adjudication is an important source of information,
the classic public good. In the course of adjudicating a dispute, a
court generates information about (1) the dispute and (2) the
process of adjudication.135 The procedural rules employed by the
court influence the production and dissemination of both kinds of
information.136 Moreover, both kinds of information affect people
beyond the immediate parties to the dispute and potentially impact
the participants’ sense of dignity, their perception of procedural
fairness, and their respect for democratic values, especially if the
131. Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The
Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979).
132. See Galanter, supra note 11, at 23 n.36 (referring to “law in the shadow of [collective]
bargaining” (citing J.G. Getman, Labor Arbitration and Dispute Resolution, 88 YALE L.J. 916,
917 (1979))). The phrase “bargaining in the shadow of the law” and variants on it appear in
many articles. See, e.g., Ben Depoorter, Law in the Shadow of Bargaining: The Feedback Effect
of Civil Settlements, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 957 (2010).
133. See Thornburg, supra note 6, at 207.
134. Id. at 206-09.
135. Id. at 207.
136. See Judith Resnik, Migrating, Morphing, and Vanishing: The Empirical and
Normative Puzzles of Declining Trial Rates in Courts, 3 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 783, 831
(2004) (observing that “public access to and information about dispute resolution have
historically been achieved through locating those processes inside courthouses”).
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procedural terms are implicitly certified or endorsed by publicly
sponsored courts.137 We recognize that the negative system effects
of contract procedure may work through pathways other than the
production and dissemination of information. Our focus on one
pathway should not suggest that we regard other lines of inquiry as
unimportant.
1. Information About the Dispute
It is widely acknowledged that the quality of a court’s decision
making depends on the facts and law provided by the parties
through the adversarial process.138 Many procedural rules either
directly or indirectly shape the production of information in ways
that are relevant to judicial determination. Rules that govern the
form and content of pleadings obviously regulate the transmission
of information about the parties’ claims to the parties themselves
and to the decision maker charged with resolving the dispute. Rules
that govern the scope of discovery regulate the transmission of
information about the background of the dispute between the
parties. Rules of evidence determine the kinds of information that
the parties can present to the decision maker. Jurisdictional rules
and rules governing the use and composition of juries determine
which decision makers receive all of this evidence. Rules that provide for class actions define the parties to the dispute and thereby
determine who is automatically entitled to receive the information
generated as the dispute moves through pleadings, discovery, and
trial. Finally, rules that govern public access to proceedings and the
publication of judicial opinions determine the extent to which all of
this information is accessible to the public and to the courts.
Contractual provisions of some kinds tend to limit the flow of
information to actors who would be entitled to receive that in137. Thornburg, supra note 6, at 208; cf. Judith Resnik, Bring Back Bentham: “Open
Courts,” “Terror Trials,” and Public Spheres, 5 LAW & ETHICS OF HUM. RTS. 2, 6 (2011)
(discussing the importance but limitations of information derived from public judicial
processes).
138. See Albert Yoon, The Importance of Litigant Wealth, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 649, 649-50
(2010) (stating that “the information provided by the lawyers will influence the decision that
the court reaches” and emphasizing the “different incentives” of the plaintiff, the defendant,
and the court).
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formation under publicly sponsored rules of civil procedure.
Confidentiality clauses prevent information about a dispute from
flowing to anyone other than the parties to any resulting proceedings and any third parties they choose to involve. Class action
waivers limit the number of parties to any given proceeding. Forum
selection clauses prevent members of the publicly designated forum
from learning about even the existence of a dispute, much less its
nature. Finally, jury trial waivers limit the flow of information to
members of the general public.139
Contractual provisions that alter or stunt the flow of information
to courts—whether through evidentiary stipulations, discovery
waivers, or other devices—could affect the quality of judicial decision making in at least two significant ways. First, information
blockage could affect opportunities to build up judicial expertise, by
which we mean the court system’s ability to resolve disputes within
the framework of existing law. That expertise can manifest itself in
several ways. For example, judges who have previously sat through
hours of expert testimony on a particular subject—whether it is
139. Commentators who advocate customizing procedure to limit information flow and
reduce litigation costs focus on the massive amounts of information production required by
the generally applicable rules of civil procedure and the limited net benefits it entails for the
parties. Offsetting the costs of producing information are the private benefits of reducing the
likelihood of an error being made in the resolution of the dispute. But it is not unreasonable
to believe that those benefits are often outweighed by the purely informational costs
associated with pleadings, discovery, trial, and appeals under the public rules of procedure.
More fundamentally, it is reasonable to estimate that contracting parties are better placed
than public officials to determine whether the private benefits of any given form of
information production outweigh the private costs, and there is no particularly good reason
to believe that the public interest will be reflected fully in the contracts written by private
actors.
These concerns are perhaps most salient when contracts contain provisions that restrict
the flow of information about a dispute to people who are not parties to the contract but who
are parties to what is essentially the same dispute. This is the effect of both broad
confidentiality provisions and class action waivers when firms use them to prevent consumers
from jointly pursuing product-related claims. Sharing information generated in the course of
discovery and trial among additional potential plaintiffs does not affect the costs of producing
the information in the first place. But it does benefit the recipients of the information by
allowing them to avoid the costs of producing it themselves—a simple illustration of why
information is considered to be the classic public good. See, e.g., Chris A. Carr & Michael R.
Jenks, The Privatization of Business and Commercial Dispute Resolution: A Misguided Policy
Decision, 88 KY. L.J. 183, 220 (2000) (positing that maintaining filings under seal or
undisclosed to the public “precludes third parties from obtaining such information and
imposes substantial costs on future litigants”).
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financial accounting or deep-sea drilling—are likely to require less
time to be brought up to speed on the subject in a subsequent
dispute. Similarly, judges who work regularly in a particular area
of the law will have a better knowledge of the applicable statutes
and precedents and so are likely to require less time to resolve
disputes that bring those bodies of law into play. They also are
likely to find it easier to avoid rendering rulings that are inconsistent with existing law. Finally, judges who regularly hear disputes
arising from a particular industry may have a better sense of the
range of potential disputes and thus a better sense of the implications of their rulings for other parties.
Second, a stunted flow of information can distort the creation of
precedent and impede efforts by regulators, legislators, and other
policymakers to identify social problems and devise public solutions.140 Economists have emphasized that the different incentive
structures of public and private judges tend to inhibit legal innovation in private dispute-resolution systems.141 This criticism has been
applied to arbitration,142 and Owen Fiss famously extended this
rationale to settlement agreements.143 The argument has bite
140. See Timothy F. Malloy, Regulation, Compliance and the Firm, 76 TEMP. L. REV. 451,
481-82 (2003) (discussing the importance of “information flow” to theories of legal deterrence);
see also Lynn M. LoPucki, Court System Transparency, 94 IOWA L. REV. 481, 494-510 (2009)
(discussing how increasing accessibility of information from court files would help legislators,
judges, and the public to monitor judicial corruption, determine how statutes are being
implemented by courts and whether revisions are necessary, and predict the outcomes of
cases); Joanna C. Schwartz, Myths and Mechanics of Deterrence: The Role of Lawsuits in Law
Enforcement Decisionmaking, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1023, 1075 (2010) (“When organizations
gather and analyze retrospective information, they are better able to make informed decisions
at improving future behavior.”).
141. See Robert D. Cooter & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Economic Analysis of Legal Disputes and
Their Resolution, 27 J. ECON. LIT. 1067, 1093 (1989) (“Private judges maximize their own
incomes by deciding disputes so as to maximize the demand for their services. If a judge’s
decision were not on the Pareto frontier, a rival judge could lure away the former’s customers
by offering decision that both parties prefer. There is, then, a strong incentive for private
judges to achieve Pareto efficiency with respect to the disputants. However, the parties to a
dispute who hire a private adjudicator do not internalize all the benefits of improving the law.
Better rules will benefit future cases to which current disputants are not a party. Thus the
incentives of private judges for creating new laws may be deficient.”).
142. See, e.g., Christine Godsil Cooper, Where Are We Going with Gilmer?—Some
Ruminations on the Arbitration of Discrimination Claims, 11 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 203,
214-15 (1992).
143. Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1075 (1984); see Symposium,
Against Settlement: Twenty-Five Years Later, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1117 (2009).
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whenever any private agreement limits the flow of information to
courts, whether by reducing the number of disputes that enter a
particular court system or by filtering important information about
those disputes from the courts.
From this perspective, forum selection clauses and limitations on
discovery are obvious sources of concern. In the first case, selecting
one forum rather than another will make it relatively difficult for
some members of the public—typically those farther from the
chosen forum—to access information that might help them to
identify the source of their injuries or to translate their harms into
legal claims. At least in relation to those people, the courts will be
deprived of the steady flow of cases upon which common law
development depends144—what Karl N. Llewellyn called the “raw
material which ... serves as grist for [legal] institutions.”145 As for
limitations on discovery, a large body of literature emphasizes the
importance of full discovery to judicial decisions in such areas of the
law as employment discrimination and consumer protection, in
which claims, legal theories, and evidentiary proofs cannot be
developed without a rich factual base.146 Similarly, commentators
point to the relevance of tort actions for improving federal agency
policymaking by encouraging the disclosure of information.147 In
144. See A.T. von Mehren, Theory and Practice of Adjudicatory Authority in Private
International Law: A Comparative Study of the Doctrine, Policies, and Practices of Commonand Civil-Law Systems, in 295 COLLECTED COURSES OF THE HAGUE ACADEMY OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 13, 57 (2002) (explaining the concern in common law systems “to ensure
that courts have available the raw materials—namely, disputes—through which law can be
developed”).
145. Richard D. Schwartz, Law and Normative Order, in LAW AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES
63, 69 (Leon Lipson & Stanton Wheeler eds., 1986) (quoting KARL N. LLEWELLYN & E.
ADAMSON HOEBEL, THE CHEYENNE WAY: CONFLICT AND CASE LAW IN PRIMITIVE
JURISPRUDENCE 279 (1941)) (alterations in original).
146. See Jack H. Friedenthal, A Divided Supreme Court Adopts Discovery Amendments to
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 806, 818 (1981) (discussing the
importance of discovery to “the evolution of substantive law”).
147. See, e.g., Gillian E. Metzger, Federalism and Federal Agency Reform, 111 COLUM. L.
REV. 1, 32 (2011) (describing tort actions as “helping federal regulators identify where to
target their regulatory efforts”); see also Margo Schlanger, Against Secret Regulation: Why
and How We Should End the Practical Obscurity of Injunctions and Consent Decrees, 59
DEPAUL L. REV. 515, 515-16 (2010) (explaining that “democracy” warrants disclosure of
injunctions and consent decrees in part because their terms “can serve as models for broader
regulation or legislation and can set the boundaries of a regulatory agency’s enforcement
efforts”).
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other words, certain forms of contract procedure may reduce the
quality and effectiveness of regulation, a significant potential social
cost.148
We acknowledge that public disclosure of information about a
dispute is not always warranted.149 One danger is that of encouraging disputants to make irresponsible allegations for strategic
reasons,150 a practice that tends to diminish the overall quality of
information available to the public. There is also the danger of
discouraging innovation by forcing the disclosure of information that
represents the product of costly investments in research or development.151 Finally, there are dignitary interests in privacy that ought
to be considered.152
We also recognize that contract procedure in some settings does
not limit the flow of information but instead redirects it in potentially fruitful ways. For instance, whereas forum selection clauses
limit flows of information to some courts they tend to concentrate
experience and knowledge in other courts. In principle, a handful of
expert judges might be preferable to many dilettantes. We do not
deny this possibility: our claim is simply that there is no reason to
presume that unconstrained freedom of contract over the disclosure
of dispute-related information will strike the right balance among
the competing factors that deserve to be considered.153

148. See Jens Dammann & Henry Hansmann, Globalizing Commercial Litigation, 94
CORNELL L. REV. 1, 9 (2008) (“Bad courts harm not just individual litigants, but the welfare
of society as a whole .... [W]hile correlation is not the same as causation, substantial evidence
in the literature indicates that a well-functioning judiciary is an important contributor
to—rather than simply a consequence of—robust economic growth.”).
149. Compare Arthur R. Miller, Confidentiality, Protective Orders, and Public Access to
Courts, 105 HARV. L. REV. 427 (1991) (arguing against procedural reforms premised on a
presumption of public access to court information), with LoPucki, supra note 140 (arguing in
favor of a presumption of public access to court information).
150. See John S. Beckerman, Confronting Civil Discovery’s Fatal Flaws, 84 MINN. L. REV.
505, 522-23 (2000) (arguing that litigants use the cost of discovery as a strategic weapon).
151. Miller, supra note 149, at 467-74.
152. See Richard L. Marcus, A Modest Proposal: Recognizing (At Last) that the Federal
Rules Do Not Declare that Discovery is Presumptively Public, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 331, 33233 (2006) (discussing the need for confidentiality in legal proceedings).
153. See generally Adrian Vermeule, The Invisible Hand in Legal and Political Theory, 96
VA. L. REV. 1417, 1418 (2010) (questioning whether spontaneous and uncoordinated market
activity will generate relevant goods or information in all cases).
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2. Information About the Adjudicative Process
In addition to shaping the informational basis for decisions about
substantive law, contract procedure can also influence flows of
information about the adjudicative process to members of the
general public and to lawmakers. Society has strong interests in
these flows of information. Public perceptions of the fairness of the
courts in turn determine perceptions of the legitimacy of those
courts and impact levels of trust in law. Meanwhile, lawmakers’
ability to make effective revisions to procedural rules depends on
access to information about how those rules work in practice.
By enforcing the procedural rules chosen by private parties, the
courts give those procedural rules prominence and send a signal
that the legal system “accepts” or even embraces them. We do not
think it is far-fetched to believe that members of the general public
who receive those signals will equate contract procedure with
“normal” procedure, in the sense of procedure that has been filtered
and ratified through democratic channels. Yet there is no reason to
believe that the drafters of such terms will take justice concerns into
account. If we are right, then it is important to consider the followon consequences. Considerable empirical evidence suggests that
people use the fairness of judicial procedures as criteria for forming
beliefs about the trustworthiness and legitimacy of the courts.154
Trust and legitimacy are, in turn, key factors in determining citizens’ willingness to abide by judicial decisions and to obey legal
rules.155
We worry that contract procedure will diminish rather than
enhance the perceived legitimacy of the courts. This is likely to
happen if contract procedure derogates from, rather than reinforces
or supplements, protective features of publicly formulated procedures. Suppose we grant that these stripped-down procedures are
advantageous to the parties who select them, at least at the time of
154. E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 66
(1988) (“A number of studies have found evidence of either direct or indirect enhancement of
evaluations of legal outcomes when procedures are viewed as fair.”).
155. See, e.g., Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and
Backlash, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 373, 374 (2007) (“[J]udicial authority to enforce the
Constitution, like the authority of all government officials, ultimately depends on the
confidence of citizens.”).
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the contract. Even then it is doubtful that other parties will consider
the diminished procedures to be fairer than the publicly designed
rules: the contracting parties themselves, or at least one of them,
may be dissatisfied with the procedures after experiencing them
firsthand. Consequently, the result of permitting contract procedure
would be to reduce overall perceptions of legitimacy.
In the absence of data on the nature of contract procedure or how
it is perceived, this line of argument is necessarily speculative. It
may be the case that anyone sufficiently engaged with the judicial
process to be aware of contract procedure will also appreciate the
fact that it represents a deviation from the normal rules. Or they
may focus on the opportunities it creates to use their own contracts
to fit their own needs. Either way, such sophisticated observers will
not use contract procedure as a basis for drawing inferences about
the general nature of public adjudication. Yet another possibility is
that people who see contract procedure in action will like what they
see, and they may draw only favorable inferences about the fairness,
legitimacy, and trustworthiness of the courts. Any of these outcomes
will belie dire predictions about the effects of contract procedure on
judicial legitimacy.
Finally, contract procedure also influences the flow of information
to judges and lawyers, and through them policymakers, about how
procedural rules work. It is unclear whether those effects are
positive or negative. On the one hand, contract procedure prevents
people from observing the consequences of invoking the rules that
parties have contracted around. As a result, it disguises the effect
of procedures that have become dysfunctional or arbitrary; it obscures the need for innovation to adapt to changed circumstances;
and it may lead to adaptations that are not well designed.156 On the
other hand, contract procedure allows private actors to bring to light
new procedural options, some of which may prompt further innovation or even be adopted by public actors.

156. Clark, supra note 13, at 1733 (discussing “‘out-of-touch’ costs”).
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C. Contract Procedure and Democratic Decision Making
Locating contract procedure within the framework of outsourcing
forces the question of whether the drafters of procedural terms are
faithless agents whose interests are misaligned with public goals.157
When the government is deciding what role it ought to play in
providing dispute-resolution services, the fact that private actors
prefer particular configurations of services, or will even opt for
privately provided services if given the choice, is relevant but should
not be conclusive. This is because the public rules of procedure are
not only private entitlements—bargaining endowments that parties
may leverage for private benefit—but also generators of public
goods. The benefits that claimants derive from the public rules of
procedure are not cashed out in a single transaction but rather overall and over time: individual contract drafters are likely to devalue
the long-term positive social externalities of judicial procedure and,
instead, will seek to extract short-term rents.158 Conversely, they
will externalize negative effects without regard to system-wide
concerns.159 Moreover, the effects of contract drafters’ decisions in
the public sphere lack visibility in any individual case; assessment
must instead be made on a system-wide basis.
There are several dimensions along which the negative effects of
contract procedure might be measured. We begin with the economic
dimension. In the presence of externalities there are no particular
reasons to assume that contracting parties will draft agreements
that fully reflect the public interest in enhancing economic wel157. See Michael J. Trebilcock & Edward M. Iacobucci, Privatization and Accountability,
116 HARV. L. REV. 1422, 1431-33 (2003) (discussing the role of externality and public goods
to profit-maximizing enterprises). We note the similarity between our argument and that of
Thomas W. Merrill regarding the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. See Thomas W.
Merrill, Dolan v. City of Tigard: Constitutional Rights as Public Goods, 72 DENV. U. L. REV.
859 (1995).
158. See Viktor J. Vanberg, Market and State: The Perspective of Constitutional Political
Economy, 1 J. INST. ECON. 23, 29 (2005) (explaining that the benefits that market actors
derive from constitutional commitments “are not derived from specific anticipated outcomes,
but are the overall benefits that result over time from having the continuing process of
interaction and cooperation bound by suitable constraints”).
159. See Stephen N. Subrin, The Limitations of Transsubstantive Procedure: An Essay on
Adjusting the “One Size Fits All” Assumption, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 377, 388 (2010) (discussing
the procedural “evils” that can result from “attorney motivations, not the least of which is
income maximization”).
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fare.160 For example, when contract procedure affects the allocation
of expertise across publicly sponsored courts, there is no reason to
believe that the uncoordinated contractual choices of private actors
will result in an efficient or fair distribution of experience, and thus
expertise, among decision makers. All other things being equal,
private actors will choose to have their disputes resolved by the
institution that already has the requisite expertise, not the one
upon which conferring the experience will do the most good. For
instance, left to their own devices, parties may be inclined to select
a distant forum that currently has the edge in terms of expertise
over local courts. They will do this even if over the long-term it
would be preferable, given travel costs and the benefits of adjudication by judges familiar with local conditions, to build up local
expertise by choosing a local forum.
The effects of contract procedure on the quality of the political
process should also be measured. We fear that contract procedure
could interfere with democratic deliberation by effectively permitting the drafter of a procedural term to “lock up” political discussion
and short circuit legislative processes. Litigation is a multifaceted
public process that resolves individual disputes and also creates
incentives, distributes wealth, and generates norms.161 The rules
and institutions of adjudication create opportunities for regulatory
activity that elsewhere in the world would be undertaken by legislatures and administrative agencies.162 Adjudication thus functions
as a form of political competition, and such activity, as the literature
160. See, e.g., Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice: An
Analysis of the Interactions Between Express and Implied Contract Terms, 73 CALIF. L. REV.
261, 265 (1985); Henry T. Greely, Contracts As Commodities: The Influence of Secondary
Purchasers on the Form of Contracts, 42 VAND. L. REV. 133, 160-61 (1989); Marcel Kahan &
Michael Klausner, Standardization and Innovation in Corporate Contracting (Or “The
Economics of Boilerplate”), 83 VA. L. REV. 713, 717 (1997); Michael Klausner, Corporations,
Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81 VA. L. REV. 757, 758 (1995).
161. See Kenneth E. Scott, Two Models of the Civil Process, 27 STAN. L. REV. 937, 937-40
(1975) (ascribing a “dispute resolution” and a “behavior modification” role to litigation); see
also Cooter & Rubinfeld, supra note 141, at 1070 (“Adjudication by the courts has two distinct
products: dispute resolution and rulemaking. From the private viewpoint, trials are a method
of resolving disputes between rational self-interested plaintiffs and defendants.”).
162. Robert A. Kagan, On Surveying the Whole Legal Forest, 28 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 833,
837 (2003) (“[T]he structures, institutions and rules of adversarial legalism ... create
opportunities and incentives for angry disputants, organized political and ideological interest
groups, and entrepreneurial lawyers.”).
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on elections makes clear, “does not exist except in the context of
state-created rules and regulations, and any discussion that presumes the contrary is simply misguided.”163 So, too, a system of
public dispute resolution—aimed at apportioning liability in the
individual case and at establishing precedent for future cases—
derives at least some of its legitimacy from publicly determined
rules that are exogenous to the parties. Consistent with this idea,
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure build on a principle of transsubstantivity, requiring that all “civil actions” be subject to the
same procedural rules, with adaptation of those rules confined to
the general framework of a national rulemaking process, which, in
turn, allows for local variation, distinct court rules, and ex post
procedural waivers under judicial supervision.164
Contract procedure bypasses the public rulemaking process by
altering judicial processes one case at a time. As industry norms
take root, contractual provisions—through the accretion of precedent and the development of judicial practice—may cause the
dilution or elimination of procedural rules on a system-wide basis
without any public discussion. Procedural change will thus occur not
through a democratically prescribed reform process that assesses
overall needs and weighs different values but rather through
contractual decisions that value efficiency above other social goals
and possibly favor the drafter’s interests over those of other
parties—and certainly over third parties—to the agreement. In
effect, contract procedure could produce a court system in which the
rules of the game reflect a set of narrow interests and not the
overall welfare.165 The judiciary’s rubber stamping of the practice
163. Samuel Issacharoff, Oversight of Regulated Political Markets, 24 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 91, 91 (2000).
164. See Laurens Walker, The End of the New Deal and the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 82 IOWA L. REV. 1269, 1280-85 (1997) (discussing the proliferation of local rules,
congressional rulemaking, optional rules, and the apparent rejection of centralization as a
procedural norm in the last two decades). We acknowledge that the public procedural system
tolerates broad variation in the litigants’ adjudicative capacity. As Frank I. Michelman and
others have noted, the disputants bring to the public courts highly divergent “equipage”
capacity; although the Federal Rules make some effort at equalization—as, for example, with
the waiver of court fees, the court appointment of experts, judicial questioning of witnesses,
and the appointment of magistrate judges focused on assisting pro se claimants—no more
than formal equality is demanded. See Michelman, supra note 89, at 1163.
165. Rakoff, supra note 76, at 1264 (suggesting that in the context of contracts of adhesion
the design of certain procedural rules “raises issues more appropriately handled by official
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might be seen as the adjudicative equivalent of democratic “lockup”
elegantly described by Samuel Issacharoff and Richard H. Pildes in
their writing about elections, in that it inadvertently creates
“pathways for private motivations to capture the use of governmental processes.”166
On the other hand, contract procedure may have a beneficial
effect on the quality of public rulemaking processes if it serves as a
signal of procedural defects that are in need of reform and locates
the problem on a political agenda. Here we draw from Albert
Hirschman’s theory of exit, voice, and loyalty.167 Contract procedure
can be seen as a form of exit from the public rules of procedure. This
modest form of exit may forestall more radical forms of exit in favor
of private processes such as arbitration. However, the potential
benefits of exit can only be realized if the signal being sent by
litigants is received by relevant actors and triggers a political
response.168 Our concern is that by permitting exit, contract procedure will discourage litigants from seeking reform of dysfunctional rules. In other words, by tolerating exit the legal system may
inhibit voice—the litigants’ willingness as extra-judicial actors to
seek political change—and suffer further deterioration. Indeed,
contract procedure may make the exercise of voice more difficult by
camouflaging the need for procedural reform. A complicating factor
is that even those who exit retain some stake in the quality of the
public courts; even private processes like arbitration depend on
precedents and judicial enforcement at some point. In summary,
authorities than by form draftsmen”). Alexander Volokh’s argument that, in the prison
setting, privatization will produce collective action problems that reduce the direct benefit
each provider derives from private advocacy and so will produce an overall reduction in
private advocacy underscores the need for empirical study of the effect of outsourcing on
political advocacy. See Alexander Volokh, Privatization and the Law and Economics of
Political Advocacy, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1197, 1204-05 (2008) (contending that “privatization can
reduce the industry’s advocacy by introducing a collective action problem”).
166. Samuel Issacharoff, On Political Corruption, 124 HARV. L. REV. 118, 129 (2010). See
Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Politics as Markets: Partisan Lockups of the
Democratic Process, 50 STAN. L. REV. 643 (1998); see also Issacharoff, supra note 163, at 96
(“The lockup problem plays the same role in political markets that monopoly or oligopoly
power plays in economic markets.”).
167. ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS,
ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970).
168. See Dammann & Hansmann, supra note 148, at 9-10 (discussing the effect of exit on
a system’s ability and motivation to respond to problems).
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contract procedure may strain litigants’ loyalty to the public courts
with ambiguous implications for the possibility of reform.
We also would take into account the distributional implications
of contract procedure. In his book, Spheres of Justice: A Defense of
Pluralism and Equality, Michael Walzer puts forward what he calls
“an open-ended distributive principle”: “No social good x should be
distributed to men and women who possess some other good y
merely because they possess y and without regard to the meaning
of x.”169 We apply this principle to the practice of contract procedure
on the view that the private act of contracting for procedural terms
ought not easily be convertible into the public act of revising the
court system “without regard” to the content and effect of the
contractual provisions adopted. Rich and poor claimants come before
the federal courts, and in any particular lawsuit the merits may
indeed turn on a party’s superior ability to hire white-shoe lawyers,
top-flight experts, and an army of paralegals. But Walzer’s argument suggests that market ordering ought not dominate the entire
sphere of procedural justice. It is one thing to delegate to private
organizations the responsibility of producing regulatory standards
that are then reviewed and endorsed, refined, or rejected.170 It is
quite another to permit contracting parties to end-run the public
rulemaking process in favor of selective private interests.171 As
Laurence Tribe explains, “The problem is not that X has more
money than Y, but that the law allows X’s superior position in the
material sphere to translate in to a superior position in all other
spheres as well.”172 The market is an important mechanism for
providing and allocating certain kinds of goods; but it ought not be
the exclusive or dominant mechanism for apportioning procedural
justice.173
169. WALZER, supra note 24, at 20.
170. See generally Verkuil, supra note 109, at 432 (discussing “the use of standard setting
organizations to produce off-the-shelf legislative enactments”).
171. See Robert G. Bone, Improving Rule 1: A Master Rule for the Federal Rules, 87 DENV.
U. L. REV. 287, 295 (2010) (acknowledging the argument that “[i]f choice of procedure affects
the distribution of power in society by advantaging some at the expense of others ...
procedural lawmaking ought to be transparent and democratically accountable”); see also id.
at 296 (“Procedural choice necessarily involves controversial value choices and difficult
tradeoffs among competing goals.”).
172. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES 242 (1985).
173. Cf. Deborah Hellman, Money Talks but It Isn’t Speech, 95 MINN. L. REV. 953, 984-85
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D. Summary
It is not unusual for commercial entities and others to devise
private arrangements to resolve disputes or to order relations when
public processes and rules are regarded as suboptimal. Moreover,
commentators recognize that in many circumstances these private
arrangements, over time, will be absorbed into the public system of
laws. Louis L. Jaffe’s classic article, Law Making by Private Groups,
explains and illustrates the myriad ways in which private commercial practices transform into government-sanctioned rules.174 Public
law may respond to private procedural orderings by addressing
deficiencies in those arrangements, or it may ratify private orderings through legislative codification or the adoption of judicial
standards.175 Undoubtedly, the public rules of procedure could benefit from the lessons of some private alternatives. But contract
procedure should not be permitted to change the rules of the game
on a case-by-case basis without serious public attention to the
practice’s implications for the continuing vitality of the overall
adjudicative structure.176
(2011) (“The fact that the market is a powerful and important method for the allocation of
resources need not imply that it is the only distributive mechanism. In fact, many goods are
distributed according to other principles.”).
174. Jaffe, supra note 20, at 220 (“[T]he great complexes of property and contract which
constitute our modern industrial machine, the monopolistic associations of capital, labor, and
the professions which operate it, exert under the forms and sanctions of law enormous power
of determining the substance of economic and social arrangement.”); see also Margaret Jane
Radin, Boilerplate Today: The Rise of Modularity and the Waning of Consent, 104 MICH. L.
REV. 1223, 1233-34 (2006) (“The law of the legislature is being superseded by the law of the
firm.”); cf. David Horton, Arbitration as Delegation, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437, 483 (2011) (arguing
that the Court’s interpretation of the Federal Arbitration Act impermissibly delegates lawmaking authority to private contract drafters).
175. See Victoria Nourse & Gregory Shaffer, Varieties of New Legal Realism: Can a New
World Order Prompt a New Legal Theory?, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 61, 93 (2009) (“Sometimes
publicly made law addresses private ordering’s purported deficiencies; other times, it codifies
privately made law (such as lex mercatoria), business custom, and business institutional
developments (such as alternative dispute resolution) into national statutes, regulations, and
institutional practices.”).
176. See Stephen C. Yeazell, Socializing Law, Privatizing Law, Monopolizing Law,
Accessing Law, 39 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 691, 697 (2006) (positing that civil justice became
privatized “not in a great burst of purposeful activity but in a series of steps that included
procedural reform, bar deregulation, and changes in financing—all of which interacted with
exogenous developments in economic life”); see also Marcus, supra note 95, at 395-98
(discussing the importance of institutional legitimacy to the procedural rulemaking process).
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The previous sections have highlighted some problems with
contract procedure that so far have not been fully explored in the
literature about litigant choice. Boiled down, our claim is that the
practice makes it difficult for individuals to obtain information
about judicial processes and commercial performance; it may increase the likelihood that unwarranted weight will be given to the
views of those who draft contract terms; and over time it may
increase skepticism about the truth of all information about publicly
provided adjudicative services. These negative externalities cross
over the boundaries of the private market into the public market for
ideas; as such, the practice may dampen competition in the ideas
market about how best to design legal procedures and suppress
respect for democratic norms. In our view, these political externalities are insidious because of their potential to distort public
discourse and political participation. At a minimum, the possibility
of these system effects warrants closer inspection of contract
procedure as used in the public courts.
IV. CHALLENGES IN DEFINING THE LIMITS OF CONTRACT
PROCEDURE
Characterizing contract procedure as an aspect of privatization
gives the practice a different cast: at the more abstract level,
contractual agreements become a feature of a “market-state” that
stands in competition and perhaps in conflict with the nation state
that previously held a monopoly on law and adjudication.177 The
norms of contract procedure emerge outside formal political or
judicial processes, and they reflect market rather than constitutional imperatives.178 In theory, these emergent procedural norms
could offer—as new governance and popular constitutional theorists
suggest—“a welcome grass-roots expression of regulatory goals that
traditional democratic processes have failed to identify”;179 alternatively, they might reflect only the narrow self-interest of economic
177. David J. Bederman, Diversity and Permeability in Transnational Governance, 57
EMORY L.J. 201, 204 (2007).
178. Id. at 204-05 (maintaining that private law reflects market imperatives and not
political values).
179. Caruso, supra note 26, at 21-22 n.67.

556

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53:507

elites. As we have emphasized throughout this discussion, part of
the difficulty in assessing contract procedure is the lack of information that currently is available about the practice. In this Part, we
propose three complementary approaches to overcome those information deficits.
A. Securing Transparency Through Information Disclosure
Private procedural ordering may bring advantages to the parties
and to society at large. Without information, however, assessing the
practice of contract procedure is impossible. At a minimum, the
public system of law needs to know more about the patterns and
scope of ex ante procedural clauses. Indeed, critics of outsourcing
frequently turn to information disclosure remedies as a way to
foster accountability and to ensure legitimacy of the privatized
function.180 Thus, for example, it is not unusual to see recommendations that require a contracting party to disclose information about
its performance and to require the government to disclose its
decision to outsource a particular function.181
Because our concern is systemic, so is our recommendation: we
urge that the parties to a dispute be required to disclose to the court
whether they intend their lawsuit to be resolved according to private
rules of procedure that displace the public rules of procedure. We
offer a simple and efficient mechanism to effect this disclosure. Our
proposal piggybacks on a form that already is used in the federal
courts—the civil cover sheet. A lawsuit is commenced in federal
court through the filing of a complaint and an accompanying
summons. Plaintiffs also must file with the clerk of the court a
document known as the “civil cover sheet,” or “Form JS 44.”182 The
180. See Paula J. Dalley, The Use and Misuse of Disclosure as a Regulatory System, 34 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 1089, 1092-93 (2007) (characterizing disclosure as “a ‘soft’ form of
intervention”); Chad M. Oldfather, Remedying Judicial Inactivism: Opinions as Informational
Regulation, 58 FLA. L. REV. 743,781 (2006) (“Under a regime of informational regulation, what
is imposed on regulated entities is not a restriction on the targeted conduct itself but rather
an obligation to disclose certain information relating to that conduct.”).
181. See, e.g., Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Privatization and Democracy: Resources in
Administrative Law, in GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT: OUTSOURCING AND AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY, supra note 103, at 276 (discussing the relation of information disclosure and
accountability).
182. A copy of Form JS 44 is attached as an appendix to this Article.
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civil cover sheet was adopted in 1974 as part of a civil docket
package pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 79(a).183 Courts
may, by local rule, provide for the electronic filing of that sheet, as
well as for all other papers filed with the court.184 The federal civil
cover sheet provides important information about the source of the
court’s jurisdiction, the nature of the lawsuit, and the identities of
the parties, and it publicizes whether a jury demand is made.185
Numerous empirical studies have mined the civil docket documents
for information about civil litigation as it actually exists in the
federal courts.186
We propose a direct information disclosure device: that the civil
cover sheet be amended to require plaintiff to disclose whether the
parties are subject to an ex ante contract that specifies the displacement of a public rule of civil procedure.187 The parties would have to
specify the Federal Rule that the contract has waived and the
183. See FED. R. CIV. P. 79(a)(1); see also ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, REPORTS OF
PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 50 (1974) (stating
that “the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts with the approval
of the Judicial Conference of the United States” may prescribe the form and style of the
district court’s civil docket); Robert Timothy Reagan, The Hunt for Sealed Settlement
Agreements, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 439, 452 n.71 (2006) (discussing adoption of the civil docket
sheet by the Judicial Conference in 1974).
184. See FED. R. CIV. P. 5(d)(3) (“A court may, by local rule, allow papers to be filed, signed,
or verified by electronic means that are consistent with any technical standards established
by the Judicial Conference of the United States.”).
185. See infra Appendix. The form provides: “Check YES only if demanded in complaint:
JURY DEMAND: G YES G NO.”
186. See, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, How Employment Discrimination
Plaintiffs Fare in Federal Court, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 429, 430-32 (2004) (discussing
results of study based on examination of terminated cases as traced through the civil docket
sheet); Reagan, supra note 183, at 447 (discussing results of study of settlement agreements
based on examination of all electronically filed docket sheets). Some district courts digitize
only the docket sheet. See Schlanger, supra note 147, at 521 (2010) (discussing practical
problems with locating docket sheets).
187. The question would have to be adapted for cases removed from state court. See
Elizabeth Herbst Schierman & Katie Ball, Civil Procedure in Idaho: An Examination of
Significant Differences Between the Rules of Procedure of the Idaho State and Federal Courts,
46 IDAHO L. REV. 13, 19 (2009) (describing the federal civil cover sheet and explaining that
Idaho state courts do not mandate this filing); see also Patricia W. Hatamyar, The Effect of
“Tort Reform” on Tort Case Filings, 43 VAL. U. L. REV. 559, 569-71 (2009) (discussing tort
cases in Oklahoma state court based on examination of case classifications as listed on the
state civil cover sheet). For removed cases, we propose that ex ante contract procedure be a
mandatory topic of discussion at the pretrial conference pursuant to Federal Rule 16(c)(2)
(“Matters for Consideration”).
THE
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language of the private rule to which they have agreed. The cost of
disclosure is minimal in terms of lawyer time and litigant resources
and, in any event, in our view the cost is out-balanced by the
important public interest in ensuring the integrity of a publicly
funded forum to resolve the parties’ disputes.188
We further recommend that the issue of procedural waiver be
treated as a mandatory topic of discussion at the pretrial conference
held pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16 and scheduled
early in the litigation before significant pre-motion practice has
taken place.189 At the conference, defendant would be required to
inform the court of any customized procedural rule of which plaintiff
was unaware at the time of filing the civil cover sheet; this information should be collected and included in the Administrative Office
database. The Rule 16 conference aims to improve judicial supervision of civil litigation and authorizes the judge to adopt “special
procedures” in categories of cases; it also encourages tighter judicial
oversight of the pleadings, information exchange, and summary
adjudication.190 Repeated amendments to Rule 16 reflect the
increasingly acknowledged importance of early judicial involvement
in the lawsuit—as Judge Lee H. Rosenthal has explained, “early
enough to make the involvement most helpful.”191
We offer these twin recommendations as a way to shed light on
the procedural rules actually used in the public courts; to assure
that the judge specifically considers whether the parties have
elected to use customized procedures; and to require explicit
attention to whether privately drafted procedural rules will negatively impact the court’s ability to reach an informed determination
188. See Hershkoff, supra note 89, at 1328 (2007) (referring to litigation as “a statesanctioned process that uses public money and is subject to constitutional constraints”).
189. For a discussion of the history and aims of Rule 16, see generally Thomas D. Rowe,
Jr., Authorized Managerialism Under the Federal Rules—And the Extent of Convergence with
Civil-Law Judging, 36 SW. L. REV. 191 (2007).
190. See id. at 195-96.
191. Lee H. Rosenthal, From Rules of Procedure to How Lawyers Litigate: ’Twixt the Cup
and the Lip, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 227, 236 (2010) (offering this comment in the context of
judicial supervision of electronic discovery); see also Charles R. Richey, Rule 16 Revisited:
Reflections for the Benefit and Bar, 139 F.R.D. 525, 527 (1992) (explaining that amendments
to Rule 16 have “replaced the historical model of the passive judge ... with a model of a
managerial, more active judge, who is involved with every aspect of a lawsuit from start to
finish”).
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of the facts and the law. The proposal is thus aimed at protecting
the integrity of the judicial system. Because the recommendation is
part of a larger package of reform, we believe it avoids problems
identified in the literature with judicial discretion during the case
management process.192
B. Encouraging Procedural Accountability Through Rulemaking
Oversight
Revising the civil cover sheet in the way that we recommend
will provide basic information essential to the study of ex ante
contract procedure as it is applied in particular kinds of cases.
Information culled from the civil docket sheet forms a part of the
extensive database that the Administrative Office of the U.S.
Courts maintains about terminated cases in the federal system.193
Commentators have highlighted various gaps in the Administrative
Office database194 (it does not, for example, code for the identity of
the judge195); our proposal would integrate information about contract procedure into the database and allow it to be an object of
study along with the public rules of procedure. Empirical research
now plays an increasingly important role in civil rulemaking and
procedural reform, and our recommendation enlarges the focus of
study to include privately designed procedural rules.196
192. See Bone, supra note 113, at 917-18 (raising concerns about the case management
model of rulemaking).
193. For a description of the Administrative Office database, see INTER-UNIV. CONSORTIUM
FOR POLITICAL & SOC. RESEARCH, FEDERAL COURT CASES: INTEGRATED DATA BASE, 1970-2000,
STUDY NO. 8429 (1998). Theodore Eisenberg of the Cornell Law School has made the database
easily accessible. See Theodore Eisenberg & Kevin M. Clermont, Courts in Cyberspace, 46 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 94, 94-96 (1996) (describing the Judicial Statistical Inquiry Form which provides
access to the database).
194. For a discussion of these omissions, see Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Do
Case Outcomes Really Reveal Anything About the Legal System? Win Rates and Removal
Jurisdiction, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 581, 585-87 (1998).
195. See Frank B. Cross, Comparative Judicial Databases, 83 JUDICATURE 248 (2000)
(pointing out this “lacuna”).
196. See Thomas E. Willging, Past and Potential Uses of Empirical Research in Civil
Rulemaking, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1121, 1141-44 (2002) (describing fourteen recent
empirical studies of civil rulemaking by the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules); see also
Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart J. Schwab, What Shapes Perceptions of the Federal Court
System?, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 501, 501-07 (1989) (discussing the “litigation explosion” thesis by
examination of trial and appellate disposition of constitutional tort cases).
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We thus propose an oversight mechanism under the umbrella of
the Rules Enabling Act197 that can holistically examine the effects
of contract procedure and evaluate whether the practice raises
concerns for judicial legitimacy.198 We urge that private rules of procedure be studied not as individual contract terms but as structural
features of the civil justice system. Empirical studies may show that
some procedural rules have important public effects, whereas others
can comfortably be treated as default rules without posing significant negative risks to the overall judicial system. Moreover, it will
be useful to determine whether the parties’ ability to customize
procedure creates incentives or disincentives for the channeling of
disputes into the public courts, rather than into privately run
dispute-resolution centers. Our recommendation aims at capturing
from contract procedure its potential for efficiency and flexibility,
while protecting against agency costs and overreaching.
Commentators often treat the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as
a “New Deal” project developed through a centralized, elite process
that depends essentially on command-and-control regulation.199 But
the Rules Enabling Act assumes a dynamic process by which the
federal rules of practice and procedure may be monitored, evaluated, adapted, and reformed. As Charles E. Clark, the primary
architect of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, observed in 1938:
[T]he first thing which experience teaches us is that our rules
should be continually changed and improved.... [W]hile there
should be rules clear enough to be understood and applied, yet
these should be changed as soon as they are found by experience
to be hampering. Even good rules may become a nuisance when
lawyers discover how to use them as instruments of delay.200

It is conceivable that contract procedure, as a privatized solution to
procedural ordering, will provide the existing system of public procedural rules with important insights about participation, informa197. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2006).
198. Cf. Nagareda, supra note 125, at 904 (recommending an oversight process for class
action settlements under the Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990, and emphasizing the lack
of delegated authority given to the mass tort bar “to effect binding regulation”).
199. See Walker, supra note 164, at 1272.
200. Clark, supra note 94, at 304.
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tion gathering, collaboration, and the development of new solutions
through the uncovering of “best practices.”201 On the other hand,
contract procedure may be shown to be insufficiently attentive to
power relations, to provide inadequate protection to vulnerable
groups, and to create systemic biases that undermine procedural
justice.202 Our proposal would assist the Judicial Conference of the
United States in its efforts to highlight federal rules that are in
need of reform;203 it would help to identify intra-circuit issues; and
it would serve the salutary function of alerting Congress of the need
for legislative solutions.204
The questions we raise about contract procedure bear a family
resemblance to those asked more than a generation ago by Marc
Galanter when he invited attention to the potential benefits of
“indigenous” law—law created by private groups outside the formal
structure of public institutions. Galanter’s hope was that indigenous
law would expand the legal system’s normative resources and
liberate law from the heavy hand of centralized government. His
questions about private ordering may similarly be asked about the
practice of contracting for procedure: questions including “under
what conditions and in what locations” the terms emerge; “the
features” that contract procedure displays; and the interaction of
contract procedure “with a larger complex legal order.”205 It remains
to be seen whether contract drafters enjoy a comparative advantage—relative to “experts, leaders, or persons in authority”206—in
devising procedural rules, or whether they are mere rent seekers
capturing public resources for narrow private ends.

201. Dorf & Sabel, supra note 18, at 316 (describing organizational structures for
stakeholder participation modeled on industrial projects).
202. See Lisa T. Alexander, Stakeholder Participation in New Governance: Lessons from
Chicago’s Public Housing Reform Experiment, 16 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 117, 133
(2009) (describing the “missing analysis of power” in new governance theory that supports
some proposals for private ordering).
203. See Jacob Scott, Comment, Article III En Banc: The Judicial Conference as an
Advisory Intercircuit Court of Appeals, 116 YALE L.J. 1625, 1625 (2007) (describing the origin
and mission of the Judicial Conference).
204. See ROBERT A. KATZMANN, COURTS AND CONGRESS 101 (1997) (“When the Judicial
Conference makes a recommendation about proposed legislation, it has special weight.”).
205. Galanter, supra note 11, at 31.
206. Clark, supra note 13, at 1712.
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C. Promoting Legitimacy Through Choice-of-Law Inspired
Judicial Review
Finally, we consider a role for the court in questions concerning
the enforcement of ex ante contract procedure. As the previous
sections have shown, many features of private procedural ordering
implicate the legitimacy of the judicial system and not simply
fairness to the individual parties. From a systemic perspective, the
boundary between contract and public procedure may be recast as
a jurisdictional struggle between two sovereigns—the “marketstate” and the public state—and understood in conflict-of-laws
terms.207 As such, a presumption of enforcement should not attach
to the contract-procedure terms if they interfere with a court’s
ability to reach a fair and informed decision in the case or if they
cause more than incidental effects on substantive norms.208
Even within an adversarial system, the judge has an obligation
to ensure—at some level—the integrity of the court system and not
simply to endorse the procedural preferences of the parties. As
Judith Resnik has written, “Courts are not ‘servants’ of the parties;
courts have an independence from the parties, not only as the voices
of other parties’ interests, but as institutions expressive of and
accountable to the public.”209 Aspects of this principle thread
through a number of doctrines. Policing the boundaries of Article III
—through the various justiciability doctrines that demand adversity
to ensure development of a record—is the most obvious example of
“the limits of advocacy,” to borrow Amanda Frost’s pithy phrase.210
Similarly, in a class action, the court is tasked with ensuring
fairness of the proceeding to ensure fairness to third-party interests.
The court resists vacatur of judgments on the consent of the parties,
and although here efficiency and waste of public capital clearly are
at issue, the perception of the parties’ gaming the court’s production
of precedent seems equally significant. In the Federal Rule 19
207. Cf. John E. Coons, Private Wealth and Public Schools, 4 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 245, 27475 (2008) (suggesting that “the jurisdictional boundary between State and parent less
resembles an inquiry about ‘due process’ than it does that cluster of enduring puzzles known
as the ‘conflict of laws’”).
208. For similar proposals for judicial review of contract procedure, see Thornburg, supra
note 6, 209-10.
209. Resnik, supra note 14, at 1527.
210. See Frost, supra note 86, at 447.
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context, the court has an obligation of jurisdictional dimension to
ensure the presence of all parties needed to design and carry out full
and fair relief.211 One can multiply examples. And although a party
may forfeit or waive a procedural right,212 the appeals court retains
the safety valve of plain-error review,213 which should be considered,
we suggest, whenever the litigant’s omission or commission
interferes with the integrity of the system.
The U.S. Supreme Court’s acceptance of contract procedure
reflects a marked contrast to its treatment of state rules of procedure that conflict with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. A
federal court sitting in diversity generally will decline to apply a
state rule of procedure that conflicts or cannot be reconciled with a
federal rule that is on point.214 Indeed, the Court’s latest foray into
this doctrinal field indicates the federal system’s unwillingness to
enforce state procedural rules that conflict with federal rules even
when important state regulatory interests may be at stake.215
Should the court’s approach be radically different if the parties
incorporate the state’s rule into an ex ante contract? At the least,
the question suggests that greater attention ought to be paid to
contract procedure and to its implications for the health of the civil
justice system.
CONCLUSION: A CONSTITUTIONAL TRANSFORMATION TOO FAR?
This Symposium has focused on the question of constitutional
transformations and how they might affect the relation of govern211. FED. R. CIV. P. 19.
212. See, e.g., Conference, Jurisdiction, Justice, and Choice of Law for the Twenty-First
Century, 29 NEW ENG. L. REV. 517, 569 (1995) (argument by Allan R. Stein that “federal law
seems to be quite comfortable with waivers of federal jurisdiction”). Forfeiture refers to a
litigant’s “failure to make the timely assertion of a right, waiver is ‘intentional relinquishment
or abandonment of a known right.’” United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993)
(discussing these terms in the criminal law context).
213. See HARRY T. EDWARDS & LINDA A. ELLIOTT, FEDERAL COURTS STANDARDS OF REVIEW:
APPELLATE COURT REVIEW OF DISTRICT COURT DECISIONS AND AGENCY ACTIONS 55-56 (2007)
(discussing plain-error review in civil cases involving waiver or forfeiture).
214. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
215. See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431 (2010); Helen
Hershkoff, Shady Grove: Duck Rabbits, Clear Statements, and Federalism, 74 ALBANY L. REV.
(forthcoming 2011) (discussing the Court’s treatment of state regulatory interests when
assessing state procedural rules).
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ment to individual. In this Article, we have raised concerns about a
constitutional transformation too far—concerns that changes in the
relation of public courts to private actors will fundamentally alter
bedrock principles of procedural fairness and judicial independence.
We fear that the practice of contracting for procedure, if left
unchecked, will contract both fairness and democratic values by
exposing the public courts, so “central to our constitutional scheme,”
to the risk of “incremental erosion.”216 We recognize that this Article
has raised more questions than it has answered, but our hope is
that our line of inquiry will encourage others to go further. Ideally,
the next step in this area would be to undertake an integrated
analysis of all forms of private involvement in the design of disputeresolution mechanisms, on the understanding that procedure is a
“seamless web” composed of interwoven threads that affect the
whole of which each is merely a part.217 It is critical that this
assessment take into account the public as well as the private
interests at stake and that it look beyond immediate benefits to the
long-term health of the system of civil justice.

216. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 861 (1986) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
217. The metaphor of law as a seamless web apparently first appeared in F.W. Maitland,
A Prologue to a History of English Law, 14 LAW Q.R. 13, 13 (1898) (“Such is the unity of all
history that any one who endeavours to tell a piece of it must feel that his first sentence tears
a seamless web.”).
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